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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. DISCUSSION 
Mobile computing is becoming increasingly more prevalent in the world today. 
From smartphones to tablets, people are using mobile computing more and more. Now, 
nearly half of adults in the U.S. own smartphones [1]. This also provides attackers with a 
new vector of attack for exploiting devices and obtaining user information. Thus, there is 
a need for better mobile security.   
There are a number of platforms from BlackBerrys to iPhones for attackers to 
target. Attackers tend to pick the easiest and largest target possible. With Android’s U.S. 
market share being around 50% [2] and it’s completely open source nature, it is a prime 
target for attackers. Trend Micro reports that the number of malicious applications in Q2 
of 2012 was around 20,000 [3]. They also note that these malicious applications were 
downloaded 700,000 times before Google was able to remove many them. Researchers 
have been and are working on a number of techniques to counter this threat. Recently the 
NSA (U.S. National Security Agency) became involved in this process. 
Early in 2012, the NSA made their first public release of Security Enhanced 
Android, or SE Android. SE Android’s aim is to improve Android security through the 
introduction of MAC and other security enhancements.   
B. SCOPE 
This thesis contributes to the currently limited literature on SE Android. With SE 
Android still being in its infancy, there is much more work that can and should be done. 
The scope of this thesis is a study of SE Android and how to use its added security 
functionality to improve application security. This research examines SE Android’s 
security policy and how it interacts with Android. A proof-of-concept application is 
developed to demonstrate how the policy can be adjusted to provide security for specific 




SE Android security policy and modify it to facilitate control of communication channels. 
We identify a weakness in the current SE Android security policy and provide changes to 
enhance security. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
General background on information security is presented in Chapter II. Also 
included in that chapter are brief histories of SE Linux, Android and SE Android for 
those unfamiliar with them. Chapter III covers the architecture of Android as well as its 
various security mechanisms. Chapter IV briefly covers SE Linux’s type enforcement and 
role-based access control policies and implementations. Chapter V provides an in-depth 
look at SE Android and how it works to improve security in Android. Chapter VI covers 
a proof-of-concept application, which utilizes the enhanced security provided by SE 








In this chapter we provide some background that will be useful in later parts of 
the thesis. We begin by introducing some basic security principles. This will be followed 
by a brief summary of Access Control followed by descriptions of three specific models 
relevant to this thesis. Then, brief histories of SE Linux, Android, and SE Android will be 
covered. Lastly, a summary of related works will be given. 
B. CIA PRINCIPLES 
Information security is the protection of information and information systems 
from unauthorized usage. It is based around three primary principles. These principles are 
often referred to as the CIA triad: 
• Confidentiality – refers to the protection of information from access by 
unauthorized individuals 
• Integrity – involves the protection of information against unauthorized 
modification or deletion 
• Availability – the assurance that information is accessible in a timely 
fashion to authorized individuals 
These three principles are at the core of information security. An argument can be 
made for adding to these principles. Two common proposals are authenticity and non-
repudiation. Authenticity is the validation that a communicating party is who they claim 
they are. Non-repudiation is a guarantee that the sender of a message cannot deny having 
sent the message and similarly the recipient cannot deny receiving it. 
The security and privacy of information while stored, processed, or transmitted is 
protected by preserving these principles in information systems. One of the mechanisms 
used to preserve these principles is access control. 
C. ACCESS CONTROL  
Access control is the mechanism by which the system provides both 
Confidentiality and some forms of Integrity security. Access control is perhaps the most 
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fundamental security mechanism used today. In general, access control models consist of 
three basic elements: 
• Subjects – the actors within a system. Primarily they are the processes or 
other elements that do “processing.” 
• Objects – the items on which subjects operate. Typically these are files or 
file like objects that store information. 
• Actions – the operations subjects perform on objects. These actions can 
include things like reading, writing, and executing. 
It is the relationship of these elements that serves as the basis for access control 
models. These relationships are usually represented in Access Control Lists (ACLs). 
ACLs contain the allowed permissions for each subject of a system. Every subject is 
allowed to perform only the specified actions on any given object as specified in the 
ACL. In systems where ACLs are implemented, every time a subject wishes to perform 
an action on an object, the system must check the ACL. The mechanism that performs 
these checks is essential to ensuring the security provided by access control. That 
mechanism is called the reference monitor. 
The reference monitor was first introduced in the “Anderson Report” in 1972 [4]. 
This influential computer security paper defined three principles that reference monitors 
need to follow: 
• Tamper-proof – The reference monitor must be protected from 
interference or tampering by an attacker. This ensures that the reference 
monitor properly enforces the security policy 
• Completeness – The reference monitor must always be invoked. Every 
operation subjects perform on objects must be validated by the reference 
monitor lest an attacker bypass and therefore violate the security policy 
• Verifiable – The reference monitor must be small and simple enough to 
be properly analyzed and tested. This ensures that the mechanism is not 
flawed and properly enforces the security policy 
Many different access control models have been developed. There are two main 
approaches on how access control is implemented: Discretionary Access Control and 
Mandatory Access Control. We discuss those briefly along with Capability-based 
systems. 
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1. Discretionary Access Control 
Discretionary Access Control, or DAC, is currently the most prevalent form of 
access control. In DAC, access is granted at the discretion of the owner or creator of an 
object. In other words, if John creates a file, he can choose whether or not to give Jane 
access and what kind of access she has.  
DAC mechanisms are generally recognized as an inadequate protection 
mechanism when used as the sole method of access control. The discretion at which 
permissions can be passed between users makes the potential for vulnerabilities much 
higher than in MAC models. For instance, if an application that is running on behalf of a 
user is compromised by an attacker, then the attacker will be able to modify all the 
resources that user has access to. This is why applications running as “root” on Unix like 
systems or “Administrator” on Windows based systems are so dangerous in a DAC 
environment. Nevertheless, the ease of implementing and the granularity of control 
available make DAC an attractive access control model. 
2.  Mandatory Access Control 
Mandatory Access Control, or MAC, allows for more controlled access control. In 
MAC, access is granted based on some defined security policy enforced by the 
underlying system. Access control is not left to the discretion of the originator. Users 
must adhere to the rules set forth by the security policy. There are a number of different 
models for MAC based access control:  Bell-LaPadula, Biba, Clark-Wilson, Role-Based 
Access Control, Type Enforcement, etc. For the purposes of this thesis, we will discuss 
the Role-Based Access Control models and the Type Enforcement model as these are the 
models at work in SE Linux. Additionally, the Bell-LaPadula model will be discussed as 
it is found in the MLS extension for both SE Linux and SE Android. 
a. Role-Based Access Control Model 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) was originally introduced in 1992 by 
Ferraiolo and Kuhn [5]. RBAC provides access to objects based on a user’s role. This 
idea of roles is analogous to roles in an organization. For instance, accountants and 
 6 
salesman would be separate roles. By grouping users based on their roles, the size and 
complexity of security policy implementation is vastly reduced. Instead of assigning 
permissions to individual users, permissions are assigned to roles, which users/subjects 
may be a member. The major elements in RBAC are: 
• Users – human or process 
• Role – job function within context of organization or system 
• Permission – operation rights on objects 
• Session – instance of a user’s connection to the system 
 
Figure 1 shows the relationships between these elements. Users can be 
assigned multiple roles. Similarly, Roles can contain any number of users. Roles are 
assigned a number of permissions. 
 
 
Figure 1.   RBAC element relationships 
In RBAC, operations performed by users are called transactions. There are 
three basic rules in RBAC as set forth in [6]: 
• Role assignment – Subjects can only execute transactions if that 
subject has selected or been assigned a role. Identification and 
authentication is not considered a transaction, but all other 
operations are. Therefore, all active users must have some active 
role. 
• Role authorization – The active role of a subject must have been 
authorized for that subject. Thus, users can only take on roles for 
which they have been authorized. 
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• Transaction authorization – For a subject to execute a 
transaction, that transaction must be authorized for the subject’s 
active role. This, combined with role assignment and authorization, 
ensures that users can only execute those transactions for which 
they are authorized. 
There are several different models or levels of RBAC that were introduced 
in a framework called RBAC96 [7]. RBAC0 is the basic model of RBAC. It embodies the 
basic principles of RBAC: users are assigned to roles, permissions are assigned to roles, 
and thus users acquire the permissions of their given roles.   
RBAC1 is RBAC0 with role hierarchies. The role hierarchy allows roles to 
subsume others. In other words, a user assigned to a role R has access to any sub-roles of 
R. 
RBAC2 enhances RBAC0 by introducing constraints. Constraints are used 
in a number of different ways. Mutual exclusivity constraints can restrict a user from 
being a member of two roles, restrict two roles from having the same permissions, restrict 
one role from have two permissions. Cardinality constraints can place limits on how 
many users are a member of a role. Prerequisite constraints can require role membership 
of a role A only if the user is a member of role B. These constraints can be used to ensure 
separation of duties. RBAC3 is simply a combination of the features provided by RBAC1 
and RBAC2.  
b. Type Enforcement Model 
Type Enforcement (TE) is a very flexible and fine-grained security model 
[54]. Like most other models, TE divides system elements into subjects and objects. In 
TE, every subject and object is labeled. Subjects are given domain labels and objects 
have type labels. These labels are referred to as security contexts. Access control is 
enforced by comparing a subject’s security context against an objects security context. 
Access can be granted between two domains or from a domain to a type; so essentially 
there are two groups of permission types: domain-domain and domain-type. 
The TE model permission map is represented in two tables: the Domain 
Definition Table (DDT) for domain-type relations and the Domain Interaction Tables 
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(DIT) for domain-domain relations. Table 1 represents an example of a Domain 
Definition Table. Subjects, the rows, can access objects, the columns, based on the 
permissions indicated in the cells. For instance, the ftp process domain has read and write 
access to public files. 
 
 
Table 1.   Domain Definition Table, from [8] 
One of the goals of the TE model is to control the flow of information 
from one process to another. By controlling access to the objects or containers, the flow 
of information can be tracked by observing how the subjects are allowed to interact with 
the objects. For instance, consider subjects A and B and object C. If subject A has write 
access to object C and B has read access to object C, then subject A can pass information 
to subject B through object C.  
c. Bell-LaPadula Model 
The Bell-LaPadula model is probably the most well-known model for 
MAC. Introduced in 1973, it focuses on protecting the confidentiality of classified 
information [9]. As with most all other models, the Bell-LaPadula model splits elements 
in the system into subjects and objects. Subjects are the active elements in the system that 
can act upon the passive elements, objects.   
Each subject and object is labeled with a security attribute. A simplified 
version of this model labels subjects and objects with two elements: a sensitivity level, 
and a category. For subjects, the sensitivity level can be thought of as a security 
clearance, and similarly for objects, the sensitivity level corresponds to a security 
classification. In many implementations, sensitivity levels correspond to Confidential, 
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Secret, and Top Secret. Sensitivity levels fall in a hierarchy with Secret dominating 
Confidential and Top Secret dominating Secret and by transitivity Confidential. 
Categories, or compartments, serve to further isolate information 
following the need-to-know principle. Within each sensitivity level, there may be any 
number of categories. For instance, at the Secret level there may be data for troop 
locations and weather data. We may not want everyone at the Secret level to be able to 
read the troop location data and using categories allows for that.  
These labels and compartments are organized in a partially ordered set 
with a least upper and greatest lower bound called a lattice [29]. In a lattice, higher 
sensitivity levels dominate lower levels (e.g. Secret dominates Confidential).   
There are three key properties to the Bell-LaPadula model: 
• Simple Security Property – This property specifies that a subject 
cannot read any objects that are at a higher sensitivity level. This is 
commonly referred to as no read-up. 
• Star Property – This property states that a subject cannot write to 
any objects that are at a lower sensitivity level than itself. This is 
commonly referred to as no write-down. 
• Discretionary Security Property – This states that an access 
matrix is used to specify additional access controls. Note that this 
property does not mean that access is at the discretion of the 
owners. 
When all of these properties are satisfied, the confidentiality of the 
information is ensured. A subject at the Secret level cannot read data from the Top Secret 
level nor can it write information down to the Confidential level. 
3.  Capability-based Systems 
Capability-based security is a security model that relies on, as the name suggests, 
capabilities. The idea behind it is fairly simple. Security comes from the handling of 
capabilities, which are commonly described as analogous to keys. While that analogy is 
not entirely accurate [27], it serves our purposes for comparing it to binder – a service 
used to manage access in Android and SE Android, which we describe in detail below. 
Capabilities are values that reference an object along with its associated rights, similar to 
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a key being associated with a particular lock. In capability systems, these keys are un-
forgeable. Thus the only way to obtain the key is to either be the original creator, or 
receive it from some entity that already has a copy of the key.   
D. SECURITY ENHANCED LINUX 
SE Linux was officially released by the NSA in 2000. Based on the Flask Security 
Architecture [10], SE Linux is designed to provide a flexible MAC solution capable of 
supporting a variety of security policies. It has since been adapted to use the Linux 
Security Module framework, an extension of the Linux kernel, and was officially adopted 
in the mainline kernel in 2003. Now, SE Linux is included in a number of Linux 
distributions including Fedora, Red Hat, and Ubuntu [55–57] and actively used in other 
systems such as EnGarde Secure Linux and Chromium OS [64, 65]. 
SE Linux makes use of MAC, TE and RBAC models. All subjects and objects in 
the system are assigned security labels, which will be used to determine access rights. 
RBAC is layered on top of TE to use roles in the grouping domain types. The specifics of 
SE Linux implementation of these models are discussed in Chapter IV. 
The core feature of SE Linux that makes it so widely used is its flexible policy 
configuration. SE Linux policies consist of any number of configuration files that contain 
all the rules to be enforced by the kernel. Unfortunately, the level of granularity SE Linux 
provides often causes these policies to become very large making it difficult for 
administrators to configure and understand the policy that is implemented. A number of 
tools have been developed to aide in the handling of the development and analysis SE 
Linux policies and the configuration files used to implement them.   
E. ANDROID 
Android is an operating system designed for smartphones and other mobile 
devices. Android, Inc. was founded in 2003 to develop smarter mobile devices. Now 
owned by Google, Android is completely open-source and maintained under the Android 
Open Source Project. Android launched commercially in 2008 and has gone through a 
number of versions since. The latest stable version is Jelly Bean, or Android 4.1, 
following the typical convention of naming versions after some kind of food. Android 
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continues to evolve with new features, and lately it has been modified to support tablet-
like features. 
As of 2010, it is the leading smartphone platform in the world. Some of this 
success can be attributed to its rich community of application developers. The Android 
Market is now part of Google Play1, Google’s online store, and houses half a million 
applications as of May 2012. With the goal of being a developer friendly platform, 
Android has a relaxed vetting process for pushing applications to market, making it easy 
for developers to get their products to users.   
Unfortunately, the ease with which applications can be introduced to the Android 
Market also increases the risk of malicious applications proliferating to devices. In order 
to minimize the impact of the inevitable malicious applications, Android provides a 
number of security mechanisms to mitigate the threat, including having the user involved 
in the determination and application of their security model. Android’s security 
mechanisms will be discussed in further detail in Chapter III. 
In addition to security mechanisms in the OS, the Android Market also has the 
capability of remotely removing malware from devices. Should malware be identified on 
the Market, this capability allows for rapid and scalable remediation without requiring the 
users to be involved. 
Early in 2012, Google announced that they were scanning Android applications 
for malware using what they called, Bouncer [11]. Bouncer is an automated scanning tool 
that traverses the Android Market looking for malicious software. Bouncer supposedly 
provides some protection against malicious applications while keeping with the Android 
theme of being a developer friendly platform. It performs a number of analyses on new 
applications using both static and dynamic techniques. However, during Black Hat 2012, 
Percoco and Schulte demonstrated how Bouncer could be circumvented by using a 
JavaScript bridge to add new, malicious capabilities to an originally benign application 
[63].   
                                                 
1 https://play.google.com/store/apps 
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F. SE ANDROID 
SE Android was developed by the NSA and released in January 2012 [12]. SE 
Android is an ongoing project at NSA and is a work in progress [12]. With the increasing 
desire to make mobile devices usable in the U.S. government, SE Android was developed 
with the goal to provide increased security to Android by providing MAC.   Since 
Android is based on the Linux kernel, SE Android naturally is inspired by and largely 
based on SE Linux. SE Android is intended to be transparent to developers and users, 
requiring minimal interaction.   
SE Android was originally developed on Gingerbread v 2.03 of Android but is 
now compatible with Android OS version 4.1.1. It can be run on the emulator, both the 
arm and x86 versions, and, so far, on the following devices:  Galaxy Nexus, Nexus S, and 
the Motorola Xoom [12].   
According to Smalley [13], SE Android is not a fork of Android, a government-
specific version of Android, a complete solution for all security concerns, nor has it been 
evaluated or approved for use. It is a set of security enhancements to Android focused on 
closing security gaps that have not yet been addressed. Like SE Linux, SE Android is 
intended for wide applicability and looks to be adopted into mainline Android. 
There is very little literature on SE Android. Most of what exists is limited to a 
wiki page2 that focuses on obtaining and installing SE Android and a set of slides that go 
along with a presentation at the Android Builders Summit of 2012. Additionally, there is 
a message board at http://marc.info/?l-selinux where questions and issues with SE 
Android are discussed. Aside from these sources, information on SE Android can be 
garnered from the source files. 
G. RELATED WORK 
There has been some work done in improving the security of Android and mobile  
 
 
                                                 
2 www.selinuxproject.org/page/SEAndroid (Active 16 October 2012) 
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devices in general. This section will briefly discuss some of this work. It is important to 
note that not all of this relates to providing MAC in Android, but it may still be of 
interest. 
SE Android was not the first attempt at integrating SE Linux in Android. Shabtai, 
Fledel, and Elovici developed an SE Linux implementation for Android in 2010 [14]. 
Their approach is very similar to the one that now exists in SE Android. It seems, 
however, that their implementation of SE Linux is merely a subset of the features that are 
incorporated in SE Android. Nevertheless, they pointed out some of the difficulties in the 
integration of SE Linux into Android that were solved in SE Android. These difficulties 
include labeling support for the yaffs2 file system used by Android and modification of 
the zygote3 source code to enable explicit labeling of its children. 
There are other attempts at improving Android security using a variety of 
different methods. Most of these focus on the identification and elimination of malicious 
activity. One example would be trying to prevent jail-breaking or rooting of devices, 
which, while legal as of 2010 under Section 1201(a) (1) of the U.S. Copyright Law [59], 
is generally frowned upon. There is always a demand for rooting as this functionality 
allows power users full control over their devices. Another example for improving 
security would be the identification of the data that leaks out over the network.   
TrustDroid was developed by researchers in Germany in 2011 [15]. TrustDroid’s 
focus was to isolate groups of applications into separate domains. For instance, one may 
wish for corporate applications to be isolated from private user applications. This cannot 
be accomplished using standard Android features. TrustDroid makes this possible with 
domain and data isolation and its application of a special security policy and mechanisms 
for enforcing it. TrustDroid extends Android’s middleware and kernel to provide MAC 
features. These extensions allow for applications to be assigned different trust levels. 
TrustDroid divides applications into three different levels: system applications, trusted 
third party applications, and untrusted third party applications. These levels, or “colors,” 
allow a policy manager to determine an application’s isolation rules. 
                                                 
3 Zygote will be discussed further in a later section. 
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TaintDroid is a framework that can detect the leakage of sensitive information 
[16]. It utilizes a dynamic taint based analysis to detect information leakage [60]. It uses a 
data flow analysis technique using data sources and sinks. It taints private data (sources) 
and tracks that data as it propagates through the system. If that data reaches a sink, then it 
will alert the user. 
XManDroid [17], or eXtended Monitoring on Android, attempts to solve the 
problem of IPC-based (Inter-Process Communications) privilege escalations by enforcing 
policies on IPC channels similar to TaintDroid. XManDroid dynamically analyzes 
applications’ transitive permission usage in order to prevent application-level privilege 
escalation attacks at runtime. Unlike TaintDroid, XManDroid can detect the use of covert 
channels leaking sensitive information. 
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III. ANDROID AND ITS SECURITY FEATURES 
This chapter is intended to provide a brief overview of the Android OS itself and 
its security features. In order to understand how to properly secure Android applications 
using SE Android, we must first have a thorough understanding the properties 
(permissions, IPC, etc.) of applications in the Android environment. We will also indicate 
weaknesses in the features and, in some cases, examples of exploits. 
A. ANDROID FRAMEWORK 
The Android Framework is laid out in Figure 2. As stated earlier, Android is 
based on the Linux kernel that provides the main system services to the Android software 
stack. The Linux kernel sits at the lowest level. It contains services such as device 
drivers, networking, and management of the file system, memory, power control, and 
process creation and management [18]. It also includes init. Init is the process 
responsible for taking care of all initialization when Android is booted up. Init 
processes the init.rc script file to set up the native services and performs the 
functions of a typical Linux system boot up. 
Several kernel enhancements, such as the binder driver, discussed below, were 
added to support Android. 
The next level up in the framework contains the Android native libraries. Written 
in C and C++ these libraries are used by numerous system components in the application 
layers. The Android Runtime includes the Dalvik virtual machine and core libraries.   
All applications in Android run in a Dalvik VM. Android applications are written 
in Java which must first be converted into Dalvik executable files in order to run in the 
Dalvik VM. One may think that this provides sandboxing of applications, but the Dalvik 
VM is not a security boundary as any application can also include native code. 
The application framework layer provides tools and services for use by 
applications. Like the applications themselves, these are all written in Java. There are a 
few critical system processes in Android to make note of [19].     
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One of the first services started is zygote. Aptly named, zygote is the master 
Dalvik VM process and the father of all Dalvik processes on the device. All processes are 
forked from zygote. Along with zygote, init also starts up some daemons. For 
instance, vold, the volume daemon, which manages the file system and rild, the radio 
interface link daemon, are started.   
The next process to start up is the system_server. The system_server 
manages many of the native services. It is responsible for initializing most of the core 
services. Among these are: 
• activity manager - responsible for managing the activities running on the 
device. It manages memory and state information as activities move 
through the activity stack. It is also the entity responsible for performing 
permission checks on intent deliveries [41]. 
• system content providers - a number of content providers are provided 
with Android for managing contacts, photos, music, etc. 
The activity manager starts several core applications: com.android.phone 





Figure 2.   Android Framework, from [20] 
B. ANDROID SECURITY MODEL 
Android is a very interesting OS in terms of its security model. It is unique in that 
it attempts to provide the users more control of the security of the system. This, combined 
with its open source nature, leads to some interesting techniques and challenges for 
providing security.   
Android is largely based on Linux. As such, it has retained some of the security 
features familiar to Linux users including things like UNIX user identifiers (UIDs) and 
file permissions, which it utilizes for DAC [21].   
There are two primary features of the base Android security model. The first is 
Application-level permissions that encompass controls of application components and 
system resources. The second is Kernel-level sandboxing, which involves isolating 
applications from each other and the system, and also prevents the bypassing of 
application-level security controls.   
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Perhaps the most important principle in the Android security model is the concept 
of sandboxing. Android applications run under their own unique UID with their own 
permissions with one exception. All applications must be signed by the developer’s 
private key when placed on the Android market. This signing is used to “identify the 
author of an application and establishes trust relationships between applications” [18]. 
The system allows for different applications to run under the same UID if signed by the 
same author.   
By default, applications running under one UID can neither read nor write data of 
applications signed by a different UID. Sharing data in Android must be done explicitly 
through the use of the inter-process communication (IPC) techniques. This isolation 
provides great inherent security because compromised applications do not necessarily 
result in a full compromise of the device provided the developer is careful when declaring 
permissions and the user correctly validates application permission requests on 
installation. 
However, even with such security features, Android is still susceptible to 
malware. This weakness comes from two primary sources: unintended installation of 
malicious applications and weak security practices by application developers. Malicious 
applications can vary significantly in their maliciousness. Unprivileged malware, or 
malware that has access to Normal permissions, as discussed in the next section, could 
be a great annoyance and hindrance to the user by randomly playing noises or running 
down the battery. Privileged malware, or malware with Dangerous permissions, can 
lead to stolen data or monetary loss. The greater danger comes from legitimate 
applications that have been coded carelessly leaving data or services unsecured. 
Accordingly, developers need to take greater care in considering how they are using 
users’ data and what services they are providing. 
Several instances of careless data management in Android (and other systems) 
applications were documented in late 2010 [22]. It was discovered that several banking 
applications for both Android and the iPhone were storing user information on the 
devices in an insecure manner. The USAA android application stored images of pages 
visited using the application that could potentially contain sensitive information. TD 
 19 
Ameritrade’s application was storing usernames in plain text on the phone. Bank of 
America’s application saved the user’s answer to their security questions in plain text on 
the device. 
C. ANDROID PERMISSIONS 
Every application that a user installs comes with a request for a set of application-
specific permissions that is set by the applications developer. These permissions allow 
the application to access system (or other application’s) data or services. These include 
things like READ_CONTACTS, which grants permission to read the user’s contact book 
and SEND_SMS, which allows the application to send SMS messages. Additionally, 
custom permissions may be created and used by the application. For instance, an 
application could use a custom permission to restrict other applications from using its 
service. Permissions for each application are found in their individual 
AndroidManifest.xml files created by the developer and placed on the mobile 
device as part of the installation process. These permissions are displayed to the user who 
must agree to them in order to install the application. An example of this process is 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.   Permission Request, from [23] 
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There are four protection levels for permissions: 
 Normal – Permissions for minor features like VIBRATE.   
Dangerous – Permissions for features that can reconfigure the device or 
incur fees. Users will be explicitly warned about dangerous permissions 
on install. 
Signature – The permissions are only granted to other applications signed 
with the same key as this program. 
SignatureOrSystem – These permissions are for programs installed as 
part of the system image and typically aren’t be used by developers. 
This system of requesting and granting permission puts a great deal of the 
responsibility for security in the hands of both the developer and user. The user must be 
aware of both what the application is advertising it does and the permissions it requests. 
Fortunately, the application reviews on the Android Market and developer’s reputation 
may help alert naïve users who attempt to install malicious or insecure applications on 
their devices.   
The developer must be sure to follow the principle of least privilege (PLOP) when 
requesting permissions. The principle of least privilege is a common concept in 
information security that requires every entity (be it a process, user, or program) have 
access only to the information and resources that are sufficient and necessary for its 
purpose [4]. Unfortunately, developers do not always follow this principle. As found in 
[24], as many as one-third of Android applications, as configured in their manifest, are 
over privileged. However, typically only a few permissions were over-privileged so there 
appears to be a good faith effort in the developer community to follow the principle of 
least privilege. 
Once an application is installed, the permissions can’t be changed. This eliminates 
direct attempts at privilege escalation (attempts that are confined to a single application). 
Privilege escalation can still occur through indirect means. 
How can attackers conduct privilege escalation attacks indirectly? One concern is 
that of application collusion attacks. Put simply, a collusion attack occurs when two 
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different permission sets combine to offer actions not intended to be allowed. In the 
Android world, this can be accomplished by two applications communicating.   
Imagine that an attacker writes up two applications:  one for managing contacts, 
and another for a cloud-based calendar application. The contacts manager has 
permissions to read from the contact list and the calendar application can connect to the 
network. Assume that these applications are following POLP. On their own, these 
applications can be considered secure. However, if the contact managing application can 
communicate, overtly or covertly, with the calendar application, then there is the 
potential for contacts to leak out over the network to an attacker. 
D. APPLICATION COMPONENTS 
Android applications can be made up of four primary components: activities, 
services, content providers, and broadcast receivers. This section will briefly describe 
these components and their related protection mechanisms. 
1. Activities 
An Android application is a collection of tasks, each of which is called an activity. 
Each activity within an application has a unique task or purpose. They are the 
components with which users directly interact. Android allows for multiple applications 
to run concurrently, but there is only one activity actively running at any given time. The 
Android OS keeps track of all running activities on an activity stack. The activity on top 
of the stack is the active activity, while those below cannot be interacted with until all 
activities higher on the stack are destroyed. 
Activities are started via intents, which are discussed later. The Activities are 
usually run in their own distinct process so they cannot access the calling process’s data. 
Control on who is allowed to start a specific Activity is provided by permission checks in 
the application manifest; specifically by adding the android:permission attribute 
in the <activity> tag. 
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2. Services 
Tasks that do not require user interaction can be encapsulated in a service. 
Services can be used in a number of ways: offloading time-consuming processing, 
performing a task that needs to be done regularly, or, as the name implies, providing a 
service for other components. Like Activities, they can be started with an intent. And, 
similarly, they can be protected via permissions in the <service> declaration in the 
manifest. Applications can communicate with services using the bindService() 
method that will result in a communications channel called a binder channel (discussed 
later). 
3. Content Providers 
Content providers are essentially databases and the programs to access them used 
both for data storage and the sharing of information among applications. They are SQLite 
databases [25]. Android provides a number of default content providers. For instance, the 
provider called ContactsContract contains the phones contacts. The browser 
provider manages the web browser history and bookmarks. The MediaStore, 
CallLog, and settings providers are also provided.  
Access control to content providers is achieved through permissions. There are 
two separate permissions, read and write, with the write permission being a blind write. 
As with all permissions, these must be declared at application installation time and cannot 
be requested at run-time. Applications that wish to access another application’s content 
provider must specify the permissions using the <uses-permission> element in 
their manifest.   
The application that created and manages the content will of course always have 
full read and write permissions. If a content provider’s application does not specify 
access permissions in its manifest, then no other application will have access to the 
provider’s data. This allows for private data storage. 
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4. Broadcast Receivers 
Broadcast messages are one way in which applications and components can 
communicate with each other. Broadcasts are sent out as intents to multiple 
applications. Broadcast receivers can read and handle these intents, allowing for 
messaging between applications. Which messages are received can be restricted by 
specifying the sender’s manifest permissions. This will cause the activity manager to 
check if the sender has the required permission before delivering the intent. 
Broadcasts can also be protected in the other direction, requiring that the receiver 
have the appropriate permissions declared in its manifest to receive the message. In this 
way the applications, which receive a particular intent, can be controlled. 
E. INTENTS 
Intents are the primary method by which Android processes move data and is 
the mechanism used for the majority of Android’s inter-process communication. They are 
essentially data containers. Data sent using intents are actually sent over binder 
interfaces, the real backbone of Android IPC (which is discussed in the next section). As 
most developers deal at the intent level of abstraction, it is important to talk about 
intents specifically.   
An intent generally consists of a recipient, an action to be performed by the 
recipient, and often data. If a recipient is explicitly identified, then it is sent to the 
specified recipient; if not, then it is up to the Android platform to determine which 
application can perform the requested action. There are a number of ways in which 
intents are used in Android. These include: starting a new activity, sending broadcast 
messages, communicating with services, accessing data in content providers, etc.   
By default, applications can only receive system (internal) intents, they will 
not respond to intents sent by other applications. In order for an application to receive 
external intents, the receiving application’s manifest must be configured 
appropriately. Either the application must have the EXPORTED flag set 
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(android:exported=“true”), or the intents must be explicitly identified via 
Intent Filters. 
Intent filters by themselves offer no security against hostile callers. To enable 
control of who can call a certain application component, a permission requirement can be 
added to the receiving application’s manifest corresponding to the appropriate 
component. Activity permissions can restrict who starts the activity. Service permissions 
restrict who can start or use that particular service. Broadcast receiver permissions 
control which applications can receive the broadcast intents. Content provider 
permissions can control who can read or write data in the content provider. 
As stated earlier, intents do not have to explicitly identify a recipient. This 
leads to a vulnerability to hijacking attacks. For instance, if an intent is sent to open a 
website without setting the recipient to com.android.browser, then it is possible 
for a malicious application to intercept this intent and launch a response to the request. 
 
Figure 4.   Implicit intent 
Another potential vulnerability is that of the confused deputy. In the confused 
deputy problem, an innocent but perhaps unsecure program is enticed by a third party 
into misusing the authority of the innocent program. Cross-site request forgery is a good 
example of a well-known confused deputy attack. In Android, this type of attack exploits 
the permission scheme [26]. In Figure 5, application A, the attacker application, has no 
permissions; application B, the confused deputy, has permissions to access application C, 
but no permission checks on its exported components. Application B is thus vulnerable to 
a confused deputy attack by allowing A access to its exported components in turn 
providing A access to the protected components in application C. Of course, this can be 
mitigated by B ensuring it conducts permission checks on its components, but in this case 
we put trust in the developers and applications, we are not relying on either Linux or 
Android mechanisms for protection. 






Figure 5.   Confused Deputy Attack 
F. BINDER 
Binder is the framework for inter-process communication in Android. It is derived 
from OpenBinder developed by Palm Inc. [62]. It has been incorporated into Android to 
facilitate communication between Android applications. We will give a brief overview of 
how binder works. One thing to consider while reading this is that, binder can be 
considered a capability-based architecture.   
Binder is a kernel module that allows for two applications to communicate. An 
application that wishes to provide a service for other applications must create a binder 
interface which the other applications will use to communicate with that particular 
service. When creating this interface, a binder reference token is created that uniquely 
identifies that binder interface. This token, along with the service’s common name (that 
which is published in the manifest), is registered with the service manager. In order for 
other applications to communicate with the service, they must ‘know’ the token of the 
service with which they wish to communicate.  ‘Knowing’ a token means that it has been 
added to a data structure that the binder kernel module maintains. The binder module 
creates and manages the data structures that hold all the binder references each 
application knows. These trees are populated by the binder kernel module as binder 
references are passed from one application to another.   
If an application, A, wishes to communicate with another application, B, several 
steps must take place. First, A will ask the service manager what B’s binder token is by 
providing B’s common name. The service manager will provide A with B’s token. 
Application A will then make a binder call with B’s token, at which point the binder 
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kernel will check to make sure that B’s token is in A’s permission tree. If so, 
communication can proceed; if not it is halted. The purpose of this scheme is to ensure 
that binder references cannot be guessed. This, along with the uniqueness of binder 
tokens allows for the binder token to also be used as a shared key. The message sequence 
for a calling application wishing to use a service provided by another application is 




Figure 6.   Example message sequence diagram for binder 
Note that the application level permissions of the service and the application are 
not checked by binder. This means that the service manager must check the permissions 
of calling applications in order to maintain security. What the binder does to facilitate this 
is to ensure that the calling applications UID and PID are provided to the service; thus 
preventing spoofing of permission sets. 
This should sound similar to capability-based systems. In the binder framework, 
the binder references are the capabilities. The only right afforded to applications with a 
particular reference, is the ability to use that reference to communicate with the 
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associated application. In the binder framework, the primary distributor of capabilities is 
the service manager. When a component wishes to be made public for communication it 
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IV. SE LINUX 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we will briefly introduce SE Linux and the basic principles behind 
it. There are entire books written on the subject of SE Linux, so we will only cover the 
basics [28]. 
B. SE LINUX ACCESS CONTROL MODELS 
SE Linux uses a combination of MAC, Type Enforcement (TE), and Role-based 
Access Control (RBAC) for its security model. At the TE level, SE Linux associates each 
process with a domain. Every domain is given a set of permissions that is necessary and 
sufficient for it to function properly. These permissions limit the files the domain can 
access and the types of operations the domain can perform on the files. The files 
themselves must also be labeled with permissions. These permissions are called a file’s 
security context. Security contexts are stored in a table and are identified by security 
identifiers, or SIDs. SE Linux makes its security decisions based on these SIDs. During 
system initialization, initial SIDs are loaded into the security context table. 
In SE Linux, the default rule is to allow no access, so every access must be 
specified with a TE rule. This type of fine-grained access control leads to exceedingly 
large security policy configurations and makes analyzing them in their entirety somewhat 
difficult. SE Linux uses RBAC in addition to TE to help simplify user management. 
Additionally, SE Linux provides options for MLS. 
1. Type Enforcement 
Type Enforcement is the main model at work in SE Linux. Every subject and 
object in the system is given a domain or type label. Subjects are labeled with domains 
and objects are labeled with types. In SE Linux, domains are actually just types 
associated with processes. The term domain is used in order to avoid confusion. This also 
means that SE Linux only has one matrix that represents access control. Instead of having 
DDTs for domain-type access control and DITs for domain interactions, as in the original 
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Type Enforcement implementations, SE Linux uses a single matrix used by the Security 
Server. The Security Server makes the security relevant decisions based on the SE Linux 
policy. 
In the TE model, access is denied unless an allow permission is explicitly defined 
in a TE rule. Figure 7 displays a typical type definition and rule declaration. Type 
declarations name a type, and, optionally, associate attributes with the type name. Rule 
declarations usually have four parts: 
Source type – typically the domin type of the process attemphing access 
Target type – the type of an object being accessed 
Object class – the class of object that the specified access is permitted. These 
group objects of the same category. For instances files, directories, and sockets 
would be different object classes. 
Permissions – the kind of access the source type is allowed for the target and 
object class. 
 
Figure 7.   Example type definition and rule declaration, from  [28] 
In Figure 7, the type declaration is identifying shadow_t as a type and 
associating it with the attribute file_type. The rule declaration is allowing the auth 
domain to read or get attributes for a file object with a type of shadow_t. 
The second statement in Figure 7 is an example of one of the two general 
categories of TE rules. Access Vector Rules (AVR) are rules that authorize access 
permissions for subjects over objects. There are a number of different AVRs: allow, 
auditallow, dontaudit, and neverallow. Allow rules permit access. 
Auditallow rules will allow access, but will also log the action. Dontaudit denies 
access, but does not log the attempted action. Neverallow specifies that the action 
should never be allowed, even if there is an allow rule somewhere else in the policy 
type shadow_t, file_type; 
allow auth shadow_t:file; 
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allowing for it. Any action which does not have a corresponding rule is automatically 
denied and the attempt is logged. 
The other category of TE rules are the transition rules. Transition rules define 
default types assigned during object creation or domain transitions. Newly created objects 
are assigned types based on the domain of the creating process and the object’s class.   
Domain transitions are domain changes caused by a process performing an exec 
command (new process creation). The new default type that is assigned to the exec’d 
process is based on the domain of the current proccess and the type of the program being 
executed. It’s important to note that domain transition rules only specifiy that a given 
transition can occur; it does not allow it to occur. Therefore, domain transitions must also 
have an associated AVR to allow for the transition to occur. 
 
Figure 8.   The first rule specifies a transition from initrc_t to ping_t on execution of a 
ping_exect_t process. The second rule allows that transition to occur, from 
[28] 
2. Role-based Access Control 
RBAC works alongside TE in SE Linux. For operations to be allowed in SE 
Linux, they must satisfy both TE and RBAC constraints in addition to standard Linux 
DAC. RBAC in SE Linux is essentially the same as described in Chapter II. The three 
basic elements are:   
• users are authorized for a set of roles 
• transitions between roles are authorized, but only if a transition between 
the two roles in question is authorized 
• every role is authorized for a set of domains.   





type_transition initrc_t ping_exec_t:process ping_t; 
allow initrc t ping t: process transition; 
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Role assignments are declared in user statements: 
 
Figure 9.   The user u is authorized for the role sysadm_r, from [28] 
Role transitions are determined by allow statements: 
 
Figure 10.   A process running in the sysadm_r role can transition to the student_r role, 
from [28] 
And lastly, authorizing roles for particular domains is accomplished using role 
statements:  
 
Figure 11.   Role sysadm_r is authorized to enter the ifconfig_t domain, from [28] 
3. Multi-Level Security 
In addition to TE and RBAC, SE Linux also supports MLS. Security contexts can 
be given a level or range that corresponds to its security level. These levels should form a 
lattice [29]. SE Linux utilizes constraints to enable the enforcement of properties such as 
no read-up and no write-down. 
C. SE LINUX POLICIES 
SE Linux policies are typically compiled into binary policy files from a number of 
different source files. Originally, policies were monolithic, meaning the entire policy was 
contained within a single file. However, policies quickly grew to the point where they 
contained tens of thousands of lines and thus were very difficult to work with. The 
increasingly complex nature of SE Linux policies made modularization a necessity [28]. 
Now, there are four basic types of sources files used to describe SE Linux policies: 
• Standard source files define things like domains, types, file contexts, and 
macros. 
user u roles { sysadm_r }; 
allow sysadm_r student_r; 
role sysadm_r types ifconfig_t; 
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• Configuration files are typically modified by administrators to define users 
and roles.   
• TE files define the policy for a particular domain.   
• File context files are used for the initial labeling of objects.   
Many user defined abbreviations and definitions are used to simplify and make 
the configuration files more readable. These are typically defined in terms of “macros.” 
When creating the binary policy files, all of these files are combined and run through the 
Linux Gnu m4 macro processor to generate a policy.conf file [61]. The m4 macro 
processor is simply there to interpret and expand the macros in the policy files. The 
policy.conf file is then compiled into a binary policy.VERSION file. 
D. SE LINUX POLICY TOOLS 
As described above, SE Linux policies for systems grow in complexity very 
quickly, making it difficult for security administrators to create, use, and understand the 
security posture of a system described by these files. A number of tools have been 
developed to assist in analyzing SE Linux Policies [30–32]. In our research we used two 
tools: 
Apol – Apol is one of the tools included in the SETools suite provided by Tresys 
Technology [32]. The suite contains tools for SE policy creation, management, 
and analysis. Apol provides a graphical interface for analyzing SE Linux policy 
files. It provides the ability to browse and search through components of the 
policy including types, attributes, roles, etc. It also allows for information flow 
analysis, domain transition analysis, relabeling analysis, and type relationship 
analysis. Figure 12 is a screenshot of Apol’s transitive flow analysis feature. 
Qisaq - Qisaq is a tool that was provided to us by the I4221 group at NSA for 
evaluation. Essentially, Qisaq is a Python interface to SETools. Qisaq was 
developed in house and is not currently available for public distribution. Because 











Figure 12.   Apol Screenshot 
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V. SE LINUX IN ANDROID (SE ANDROID) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Security Enhanced Android is under development by the NSA [12]. It was first 
released back in January of 2012. The goal of SE Android is to increase the security of 
Android by enforcing separation guarantees between applications. Since SE Android is 
still a work in progress, it has not been evaluated or approved for official use. While SE 
Android is intended to be a mainstream enhancement to Android with limited user 
interaction, we thought it would be interesting to see how it could be used to help secure 
a specific application architecture. 
B. FEATURES 
SE Android improves Android security in a number of ways. It confines 
privileged daemons, implements strong separation between applications, and provides for 
a centralized security policy that can be formally analyzed [12]. SE Android does more 
than just integrate SE Linux into Android. It also provides some extensions to the 
Android middleware to enhance MAC security.   
Install-time MAC enables the checking of the permissions granted to installed 
applications against a policy. In other words, it can protect naïve users from installing 
applications with dangerous permissions by forcing a check against a MAC permission 
policy. 
The following two mechanisms were not implemented in the version of SE 
Android used in this thesis [12]. The first is a tag propagation mechanism that tracks 
permissions between communicating application. This mechanism is like that provided 
by TaintDroid4. Initially, the set of tags for each application is based on its granted 
permissions. Upon IPC with another application, each application receives the union of 
the individual sets of tags from all the apps involved in the IPC. If that union violates 
policy rules, then the communication is blocked. This mechanism is an effective way to 
                                                 
4 See the Related Works section of Chapter II. 
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prevent the application collusion attacks talked about earlier. The second unimplemented 
mechanism supports permission revocation. This allows the revocation of permissions 
from installed applications using the SE Manager application. 
C. REFERENCE POLICY  
SE policies for SE Android are found under the external/sepolicy 
directory in the SE Android build source files. These files can be downloaded directly 
from [33]. This section will highlight the capabilities of the reference policy that came 
packaged with the SE Android distribution. The version of the policy described here was 
downloaded as part of the SE Android modifications for Android 4.0.4. According to 
Smalley in [34], the “goals for the SE Android policy are to confine the privileged 
daemons in Android, ensure that the Android middleware components cannot be 
bypassed, and ensure that applications are truly isolated from one another at the kernel 
layer.”   
It is important to note that the build and policy we will be using is from July 2012. 
Since SE Android is a work in progress, the policy is continually changing as problems 
are discovered and new features are added.   
1. Domain Rules 
The basic domain rules are found in the domain.te file. This file contains the 
AVRs which all domains need to function. These access rules are all associated with the 
attribute domain.   
The AVRs include intra-domain accesses that simply allow a domain to access its 
own elements like file descriptors, directories, etc. Device accesses are also included. 
Figure 13 displays the defined device accesses for every domain.    The accesses granted 
to the domain attribute are kept to a bare minimum. For instance, the rule for 
socket_device only allows for searching of current sockets on /dev/socket and 
not creation of or reading from sockets. 
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Figure 13.   AVRs specifying domain access rules for system devices, from [33] 
2.  Application Domains 
The file defining AVRs for applications is found in app.te. These rules apply to 
applications that lack a predefined platform UID (system, radio, etc.). Originally, it was 
divided into three sections with rules for the following:  appdomain, trusted_app, 
and untrusted_app.   
The trusted_app domain is no longer in use in current versions of SE 
Android. It has been replaced in favor of more distinct trusted domains. It has been 
separated into four separate domains each with their own set of AVRs. They are the 
platform_app, media_app, shared_app, and release_app domains that 
correspond to the AOSP5 build keys [36]. 
All applications are members of the appdomain. It provides the base set of 
rules that all applications must have in order to function. There are a few rules regarding 
its interaction with zygote. For instance, appdomain can use open file descriptors 
that were inherited from zygote. There is also a pair of rules that allow members of the 
appdomain to create file and directory permissions to enable sandboxing of their own 
                                                 
5 Android Open Source Project maintains the source code for Android and its various versions. 
allow domain device:dir search; 
allow domain devpts:dir search; 
allow domain device:file read; 
allow domain socket_device:dir search; 
allow domain null_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 
allow domain zero_device:chr_file r_file_perms; 
allow domain ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 
allow domain binder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 
allow domain ptmx_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 
allow domain powervr_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 
allow domain log_device:dir search; 
allow domain log_device:chr_file w_file_perms; 
allow domain nv_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; 
allow domain alarm_device:chr_file r_file_perms; 
allow domain urandom_device:chr_file r_file_perms; 
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files. Lastly, the appdomain uses a set of macros that describe binder accesses to allow 
for binder IPC use. These macros will be discussed in more detail in a later section, they 
allow the appdomain to perform binder IPC calls to members of the 
binderservicedomain and trusted_app domain. 
 
Figure 14.   AVRs for appdomain, from [33] 
Since all applications are members of the appdomain, the policy divides 
applications into two categories: trusted and untrusted. Untrusted applications, naturally, 
have fewer permissions. Access is restricted to the network, Bluetooth, SD Card, as well 
as native applications. These are controlled by Booleans that are currently managed by 
the SE Manager application. Untrusted applications fall under the same rules as the 
appdomain regarding the use of binder. 
The platform_app, media_app, shared_app and release_app 
domains were all originally united under the trusted_app domain. This was changed 
when install-time MAC was introduced to allow for more granularity in the permissions 
of the different system applications. All of these applications are also 
mlstrustedsubjects. This term will be discussed in the MLS section below.   
allow appdomain zygote:fd use; 
allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read; 
allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld; 
allow appdomain system:fifo_file rw_file_perms; 
allow appdomain app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; 
allow appdomain app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set  
create_file_perms; 








The policy contains a file called seapp_contexts, which is unique to the SE 
Linux implementation in Android. The seapp_contexts file is used to label, or add 
security contexts to application processes and their package directories. In order to label 
an application process, a domain must be specified. Similarly, to label an application 
directory a type must be specified. The seapp_contexts file is read by 
libselinux/android.c which labels entities based on a set of precedence rules. 
The rules are as follows: 
(1) isSystemServer=true 
(2) specified user before unspecified user  
(3) fixed user string before user prefix string with a wildcard (*)  
(4) longer user prefix over shorter prefix  
(5) specified seinfo before unspecified seinfo  
(6) specified name before unspecified name  
This first check is whether the process is the System Server. If so, it will be 
labeled with the system domain. Note that there is only one System Server. The second 
check serves to determine if the application runs under a predefined platform user:  
system, nfc, radio, etc. The third and fourth checks simply deal with different user 
strings, with fixed strings coming before prefix strings (app_*) and longer prefixes 
coming before shorter ones. The fifth rule checks for an seinfo string that is used to look 
up the security context of an application process. The last rule checks whether a package 
name has been specified. This allows for specific application labeling. 
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Figure 15.   seapp_contexts statements, from [33] 
Figure 15 shows the statements from an early version of the seapp_contexts 
file. The first statement is simply assigning the System Server to the system domain. The 
second statement will map application processes under the system user id to the system 
domain and their application directories to system_data_file. Similarly, 
applications under the nfc and radio user id are given their own process and directory 
labels. The next rule for untrusted_apps is the catchall statement. Any application 
that does not match any of the other statements falls under the untrusted_app 
domain. The next statement is for trusted_apps and the last is specific for the 
application com.android.browser.  
The seinfo string was rather unclear as to its purpose in earlier builds of SE 
Android. This is because it was hardcoded with only a systemApp value, which 
specified applications in the system partition. So, in Figure 15, any application in the 
system partition was labeled under the trusted_app domain with the exception of 
com.android.browser due to name precedence. This has since been updated with 
the introduction of install-time MAC and is explained in the next section. 
4. Install-time MAC 
Install-time MAC is a feature unique to SE Android. It allows for specification of 
MAC on the Android permissions that applications request at install time. The policy 
configuration for this feature is found in the mac_permissions.xml file. With it, 
MAC rules can be placed on the different permissions to either allow or deny a requested 
isSystemServer=true domain=system 
user=system domain=system_app type=system_data_file 
user=nfc domain=nfc type=nfc_data_file 
user=radio domain=radio type=radio_data_file 
user=app_* domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file  
levelFromUid=true 
user=app_* seinfo=systemApp domain=trusted_app  
levelFromUid=true 
user=app_* seinfo=systemApp name=com.android.browser  
domain=browser_app levelFromUid=true 
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permission. This allows for the Android permission security mechanism to be controlled 
by a central policy rather than individual users. Dangerous permissions can be explicitly 
denied so that naïve users are less likely to compromise their device. Figure 16 shows 
how the mac_permissions.xml file is organized. 
 
Figure 16.   mac_permissions.xml, from [33] 
<signer signature="308204a8308…" > 
    <allow-all /> 
    <seinfo value="platform" /> 
    </signer> 
 
<signer signature="308204a83082039…” > 
  <seinfo value="release" /> 
    <deny-permission name="android.permission.BRICK"/> 
    <deny-permission name="android.permission.READ_LOGS"/> 
    … 
    <package name="com.android.browser" > 
      <allow-permission name="android.permission. 
  ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION”/> 
      <allow-permission name="android.permission. 
  ACCESS_DOWNLOAD_MANAGER"/> 
      <allow-permission name="android.permission. 
  ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION"/> 
 … 




    <seinfo value="default"/> 
    <deny-permission name="android.permission. 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION"/> 
    <deny-permission name="android.permission. 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION"/> 
    <deny-permission name="android.permission. 
AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS"/> 
    <deny-permission name="android.permission. 
CALL_PHONE"/> 
    <deny-permission name="android.permission.CAMERA"/> 
    <deny-permission name="android.permission.READ_LOGS"/> 




In Figure16, there are different sets of permissions for three different types of 
applications. The <signer> element determines what applications receive its 
permission set. Specifically, they represent the keys used to identify the authors of an 
application. The first signer corresponds to platform applications and the second signer 
corresponds to release applications. Generally, third party applications have their own 
unique key that must be added to this file to enforce MAC on permissions specific to that 
application. However, keys that are not specified in the mac_permissions.xml file 
fall under the default group. 
Each <signer> element and the <default> element can have several child 
elements. The <seinfo> element corresponds to the seinfo string found in the 
seapp_contexts file. This will associate the application(s) specified by the 
<signer> element to the corresponding labeling rules in seap_contexts. This 
allows for controllable application specific labeling.   
The <allow-permission> and <deny-permission> tags allow for 
white-listing and black-listing of android permissions. For instance, <deny-
permissions name=“android.permission.READ_LOGS”/> will deny the 
parent <signer> application the READ_LOGS permission. There is also an <allow-
all> tag if an application should not be denied any permissions.   
Lastly, the <package> tag can define the same rules for specific packages. The 
rules for the <package> element override those of its parent <signer> element. The 
<package> tag can also exist outside of a <signer> parent element in which case 
they can also have their own <seinfo> tag.   
5. Important System Applications 
In this section we will describe the policies for some of the important processes in 
Android. The functionality of some of the processes have been modified from their SE 
Linux versions for compatibility with SE Android. 
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a. General System Apps 
The system.te file contains AVRs for the system_server as well 
as other applications that run under the system UID. The system_server is more 
privileged than the other system applications because, as noted above, it is responsible for 
managing native services. As such, it has permissions you would expect for service 
management:  scheduling and killing processes, communicating with daemons, managing 
data and cache files, and a few other managerial operations. 
The other applications running under the system UID are not as privileged 
as the system_server. These applications, which include the UI and settings 
applications, are given the basic set of permissions associated with applications. 
Additionally, they can perform binder functions for services and applications referenced 
in the  appdomain. The settings application was originally responsible for managing 
the SE Linux mode (enforcing or permissive) and SE Linux Booleans. In current versions 
of SE Android, these are now managed by a separate system application called SE 
Manager. 
b. Init 
Init is an important daemon as discussed in the Android framework 
section. It is responsible for the initialization of Android. The init domain, along with 
the kernel and su domains, makes use of the unconfined_domain macro, which 
associates with it the type attributes mlstrustedsubject and 
unconfineddomain. The mlstrustedsubject exempts the domain from MLS 
constraints, and unconfineddomain allows it to do anything. 
Also, since init is responsible for starting up the various daemons, it 
must allow for those daemons to transition from init’s domain to their respective 
domains. The macro init_daemon_domain(domain) sets the “permissions” in 
te_macros file that allow those transition to happen. 
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c. Zygote 
Zygote is the process from which all other processes are spawned. 
Zygote has been modified in SE Android to allow it to set security contexts for the 
applications it spawns. It also maps the DAC credentials of its children to the security 
context [34]. As such, it must have permissions enabling it to perform the proper 
functions when forking new processes. It must also be able to transition into new 
domains. Zygote can transition into either the system domain or the appdomain 
domain. 
 
Figure 17.   Zygote dyntransition permissions, from [33]   
d. Service Manager 
The service manager, as discussed earlier in the binder section, handles 
binder requests and transfers references. The service manager does not need to pass its 
own reference as it is static and known by all, and it only ever receives requests. 
Therefore, the service manager’s rule set is simple.   
 
Figure 18.   Service manager IPC rules, from [33] 
e. Media Server 
Permissions for the media server are found in mediaserver.te. The 
media server is responsible for managing and indexing images, videos, and music files. It 
requires access to multimedia devices including: SD Card, camera, video, and audio 
devices. It is also a member of binderservicedomain, which marks it as being a 
binder service and allowing binder IPC to system services. 
allow zygote system:process dyntransition; 
allow zygote appdomain:process dyntransition; 
allow servicemanager self:binder set_context_mgr; 
allow servicemanager domain:binder; 
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f. Installd 
The installer daemon, like zygote, has been modified for SE Android. 
As the name implies, installd is responsible for installing applications. It has been 
modified to label the application data directories that it creates as part of the install 
process. It reads from the seapp_contexts configuration for labeling purposes.   
6. Macros 
This section will briefly cover some of the macros used in policy definitions. 
These macros provide shortcuts to assigning domains attributes or AVRs. The ones 
discussed here are those used for application policies, not those that are used for system 
applications. Most of these macros deal with control of IPC mechanisms. 
The first macro we describe is the app_domain(domain) macro. This does 
two things. First, when it is expanded, it assigns the type attribute appdomain to the 
input argument domain. As mentioned earlier, the appdomain is associated with the 
base set of permissions required by all applications. The second part of the macro is 
actually another macro: tmpfs_domain(domain).   
The tmpfs_domain macro, when expanded, defines a unique file type for the 
domain to use when creating tmpfs (temporary file storage), shmem (shared memory), 
and ashmem (anonymous shared memory) files. It describes how to provide further 
guarantees of isolation for application data. Figure 19 shows these two macros. Note that 
the $1 signifies the first input parameter. If written as a function it would look like 
app_domain($1). 
 
Figure 19.   app_domain and tmpfs_domain macros, from [33] 
define(`app_domain’, ` 
 typeattribute $1 appdomain; 
 tmpfs_domain($1) ‘) 
define(`tmpfs_domain’, ` 
 type $1_tmpfs, file_type; 
 type_transition $1 tmpfs:file $tempfs; 
 allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file {read execute execmod}; ‘) 
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The net_domain(domain) macro associates the input domain with the type 
attribute netdomain. The AVRs for netdomain are found in the net.te file. These 
rules allow for the use of network sockets and connecting and binding to tcp and udp 
sockets. 
 
Figure 20.   netdomain AVRs, from [33] 
When expanded the next pair of macros set up the AVRs for access control for 
general socket usage. As seen in the last statement in Figure 22, the macro, 
unix_socket_connect( clientdomain, socket, serverdomain), 
allows for socket connections from a client domain to server domain via a socket. The 
other macro is 
 unix_socket_send(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain).   
This allows for the socket operation send to be performed from the client domain to the 
server domain via a socket. 
 
Figure 21.   Socket macros, from [33] 
The last set of macros set up the AVRs for the controlled use of the binder. The 
first of these is binder_use(domain), which sets up the domain to allow it to use 
allow netdomain self:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } *; 
allow netdomain node_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } 
node_bind; 
allow netdomain port_type:udp_socket name_bind; 
allow netdomain port_type:tcp_socket name_bind; 
allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket {create bind 
read nlmsg_read}; 
unix_socket_connect(netdomain, dnsproxyd, netd) 
 
define(`unix_socket_connect', ` 
allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write; 
allow $1 $3:unix_stream_socket connectto; ') 
define(`unix_socket_send', ` 
allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write; 
allow $1 $3:unix_dgram_socket sendto; ') 
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binder IPC. This entails allowing the domain to retrieve binder references from the 
service manager. Additionally, it allows sending and receiving binder references to and 
from itself. The transferring of binder references is accomplished by the macro 
binder_transfer( clientdomain, serverdomain). The 
binder_call(clientdomain, serverdomain) macro allows for the client 
domain to perform binder IPC calls to the server domain. This is accomplished in two 
rules: allowing the receipt and calling of the server’s binder reference and allowing the 
use of the servers file descriptors.   
 
Figure 22.   Binder macros, from [33] 
These are the macros of most interest for writing policies for specific applications. 
There are many other macros found in the global_macros, te_macros, and 
mls_macros files. Some of the macros for MLS will be discussed in the next section. 
7. MLS 
There are two files relating to MLS in the policy: mls and mls_macros. These 
files provide the architecture that allows for MLS policies to be used. Currently, there is 
only one sensitivity level defined: s0. As mentioned earlier, SE Android improves 
application separation by using MLS categories. Every application is labeled with its own 
category: c0 to cN-1.   
The mls and mls_macros files provide for easy deployment of MLS policies. 
They provide for placing constraints on: processes, sockets, directories and files, and IPC. 
These constraints follow the Bell-LaPadula model with the exception that 
define(`binder_use', ` 
 allow $1 servicemanager:binder call; 
 allow $1 self:binder { transfer receive }; 
 allow $1 ashmem_device:chr_file execute; ‘) 
define(`binder_call', ` 
 allow $1 $2:binder { receive call }; 
 allow $1 $2:fd use; ‘) 
define(`binder_transfer', ` 
allow $1 $2:binder transfer; ') 
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mlstrustedsubjects are exempt from these constraints. There are 13 important 
system processes that are labeled mlstrustedsubjects: adbd, debuggerd, 
drmserver, init, installd, kernel, mediaserver, netd, su, 
surfaceflinger, system, vold, and zygote. 
D. SE MANAGER 
SE Manager is an application packaged with SE Android that allows for the 
configuring of SE Android enforcing modes:  SE Linux enforcing mode, and MAC 
enforcing mode. The SE Linux mode corresponds to the traditional SE Linux enforcing 
and permissive modes. Enforcing mode actively denies AVR violations. Permissive mode 
monitors for and reports violations but does not deny actions. The MAC enforcing mode 
is for the enforcing of the install-time MAC permission checks. The application also 
allows for the setting of the various Booleans included in the policy. These Booleans 
allow for conditional granting of access based on their value. For instance, the 
android_cts Boolean will grant the permissions needed for the Android 
Compatibility Test Suite to run when set. Lastly, the application allows for the viewing of 
SE Linux and MAC logs. 
E. SE ANDROID VS EXPLOITS 
In [10], Smalley outlines how various Android exploits would be prevented by SE 
Android. Most of these exploits are simply variations of the same vulnerabilities. In this 
section  we will briefly describe several of these case studies. 
1. RageAgainstTheCage 
RageAgainstTheCage, also known as “CVE-2010-EASY,” is an exploit that 
results in an adb (used for debugging) shell running as root [35]. It takes advantage of a 
vulnerability in the setuid(uid) function. The problem is that setuid does not drop 
privileges if the RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit is hit. The setuid(2) man page declares 
[36]:  “ERRORS - EAGAIN The uid does not match the current uid and uid brings 
process over its RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit.”  The RLIMIT_NPROC is “the 
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maximum number of processes that can be created for the real user ID of the calling 
process” [37]. 
RageAgainstTheCage begins by iterating through the processes in the /proc 
directory, where the proc file system resides. That directory contains information about 
all the processes running in the system. It is searching for the /proc/pid/cmdline 
file belonging to adb. This exploit would be prevented by SE Android because adb’s 
/proc/pid directory has been labeled with the security context u:r:adbd:s0, 
which would render it unreadable by untrusted applications with the context 
u:r:untrusted_app:s0:cN. Furthermore, upon exec of a shell, the security 
context would change; so while the shell would indeed be running as root, it would be 
running in a restricted security context.  
The Zimperlich exploit does essentially the same thing but spawns an application 
component with escalated privileges by causing zygote’s setuid to fail [35]. It too 
would not work in SE Android. 
2. Exploid 
Exploid is a jail-breaking exploit that appeared in 2010. It utilized a vulnerability 
in Netlink as detailed in CVE-2009–1185 [38]. The problem is that udev, the device 
manager, did not verify whether Netlink messages came from kernel space or user space. 
This allowed local users to gain privileges by sending a Netlink message from user space. 
In Android, the vulnerability was inherited as much of udev’s functionality was ported 
over. 
Exploid works by using the Netlink vulnerability to perform an arbitrary write as 
root to an arbitrary file; in this case /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug. Hotplug gets 
invoked anytime a device is plugged in. The contents of hotplug are overwritten to point 
to the exploit code to be executed. In SE Android, this exploit would be stopped in two 
ways. First, the creation and use of Netlink sockets is denied by the policy. Secondly, the 
write to /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug would be denied because of the security 
context despite the writing process being root.  
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VI. PROOF OF CONCEPT APPLICATIONS AND POLICY 
A. SCENARIO INTRODUCTION 
The scenario that our proof-of-concept is based on is a calendar application that 
can work with data from calendars of different categories.   
For this thesis, we built a system that will display data from two different 
calendars in non-interacting domains. The system provides a single display for the two 
calendars. There is a mechanism for managing one of the two calendars. The display will 
only show full information for the calendar that is currently being managed. 
We did not code up the complete application due to its complexity and our time 
constraints. The goal was to determine how to configure the security policy to allow for 
their secure interactions and operations. Instead the applications are merely partial 
implementations that reflect the kinds of operations that would be performed in such an 
application. The communication channels and data stores are complete so that the policy 
can be properly analyzed. 
Our testing environment is a 64-bit Fedora16 virtual machine that contains the 
Android ARM emulator running Android 4.0.4 (Ice Cream Sandwich) using NSA’s 
release of SE Android pulled in June 2012 from [39].   
B. ARCHITECTURE OF APPLICATIONS 
The application is actually a set of applications that work together. There are three 
different types of applications: the main application, the trusted controller, and the 
separate calendar applications. A diagram of the components and their communications 
channel is shown in Figure 25. The source code for these applications can be found in 
Appendix A. 
1. Main Application 
The main application, shown in Appendix A, Section 1, is the only application 
that is visible to the user and that the user can interact with. This main application 
displays the data from the two separate data stores with one set being redacted depending 
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on which mode it is in. The main application does not communicate with these data stores 
directly. Instead it feeds requests through a trusted controller.   
There are two activities in the main application. The first, seen in Figure 23, 
allows for the selection of which mode it is in. This mode determines which data is 
displayed and which is redacted.   
 
Figure 23.   Selection Activity of the Main Application 
The second activity communicates with the trusted controller to perform actions 
on the calendar applications. It does so by binding to an IBinder interface exported by the 
trusted controller. An IBinder interface allows for an application to export functions as a 
service for other applications to use. In this implementation, the only operation available 
is a read table request which simply has the data sent to this application to display. 
Communications with the trusted controller is done over a binder interface to emulate 
how this would be done in a complete implementation. Lastly, the second activity 
implements a broadcast receiver to handle the data being sent to it by the two calendar 
applications. It would probably be better to use regular intents instead of broadcast 
intents, but broadcast intents were used to allow testing of the install-time MAC 
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feature of SE Android. After receiving that data, the activity then displays it in a table 
format as seen in Figure 24.   
 
 
Figure 24.   Display Activity with view 0 selected (left) and view 1 selected (right) 
2. Trusted Controller 
The trusted controller is the main reason we did not fully develop this application 
as its complexity exceeds the scope of this thesis. For the purpose of this thesis, we 
assume that the trusted application is ‘secure’, that is that it is correctly implemented.    
We are assuming that it will only send the correct request to the calendar app that it was 
instructed to. The trusted controller receives requests from the main application and then 
communicates with the separate calendar applications. These requests are received via an 
IBinder interface. Only one function was exported to this interface. That was the 
readTables() function, which would ask the calendar applications to send query 
results to the main application. 
Communications with the calendar applications is also done via an IBinder 
interface connection. The reasoning behind this is that it is expected in normal usage of 
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the full application to have the user perform multiple requests that would make an 
established binder connection more efficient.   
3. Calendar Applications 
There are two calendar applications in our implementation. For the purposes of 
this thesis, these two applications will communicate with content providers on the SE 
Android device to store their data. In the real world, it is more likely that this data will be 
housed in the cloud for availability on multiple devices. In our proof-of-concept each 
calendar application implements its own content provider. Within each content provider 
the applications store ‘appointment data’ in a database. This database consists of one 
table, dates, with the following columns: date_id, date, and comments. This table 
is meant to represent the type of data found in a simple calendar application. The date 
represents the date/time of the appointment and the comments describe the appointment. 
For this study, these tables have been prepopulated with data to simplify the applications, 
i.e., we are not implementing the calendar update function. Inserting more data into the 
content providers of each of the applications would take the same communication paths 
as reading does, and so it would not affect the SE Android policy. 
Like the trusted controller, these applications implement an IBinder interface. 
This interface implements one function that allows for queries against the content 
provider. The results of those queries are then packaged up in a broadcast intent and 
sent to the main application. The data sent to the main application is added as an extra 
data item to the intents using intent.putExtra(name, data). 
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Figure 25.   Communication channels for the applications 
C. SECURITY GOALS/REQUIREMENTS 
There are several security goals for this proof-of-concept. Most goals relate to the 
prevention of the leaking of information from one calendar to another and from the 
calendars to other applications. The goals are as follows: 
• There is to be no information flow between the individual calendar 
applications.   
• The data stored in the content providers should be accessible only to the 
proper applications.   
• The data sent via broadcast intents should only be received by the 
main application.   
• Only the applications specified earlier within the proof-of-concept are 
allowed to bind to the exported services. 
One may notice that it appears possible for data to pass from one calendar 
application to the other through the allowed communications channels. For instance, the 
display application could receive data from one calendar application, and then send it to 
the trusted controller, which will then send it to the other calendar application. As noted 
earlier, this is not a complete implementation and we are trusting that the trusted 
controller would not allow that to happen. However, in the discussion section, we 
propose an alternate architecture to prevent this channel. 
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D. ANDROID SECURITY 
Each application is protected by permissions declared in their 
AndroidManifest.xml file. Five custom permissions have been defined: one for access to 
the controller, two for access to each of the calendar apps, and two permissions to be used 
for the broadcast intents. The controller and calendar applications each define and 
place a permission on their services. The display application uses the controller 
application permission, and the controller application uses each of the calendar 
application permissions. The calendar applications place a permission requirement on the 
broadcast intents they send to the display application using 
sendBroadcast(intent, permission). This ensures that only applications 
with the proper permission can receive that intent. 
The content providers implemented by each of the calendar applications are 
protected by default. If no permissions are added to the manifest regarding access to the 
providers, then only the application implementing the providers can access it. 
1. Deficiencies 
The only place where the basic Android security features are weak is in the 
permissions. The problem lies in the fact that malicious developers can simply read the 
manifest of the application declaring the permission, and then use that permission in their 
own application. The user would then be asked whether to grant that permission to the 
malicious application on install. The android:description tag would be displayed 
and, if that tag was not defined or gives insufficient detail, a naïve user may grant it 
permission. 
There are two ways that SE Android can mitigate this problem. The first is by 
placing MAC on the communication channels between the applications themselves. This 
will prevent any outside application from communicating with applications it should not 
have access to. The second way is by placing MAC on the permissions themselves. Using 
the install-time MAC feature, the permissions can only be granted to certain applications.  
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E. SE LINUX POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
The process of writing policies for new applications is fairly straightforward for 
SE Android. This is because there are already macros and domains defined which provide 
most of the permissions needed for applications to work. There are only a handful of files 
that need to be updated: seapp_contexts, optionally the 
mac_permissions.xml, and the separate TE file containing the policy.  
The policy for the proof-of-concept application was made by first labeling the 
applications via the seapp_contexts file. Then, with permissive mode enabled, the 
application was run looking for any logged SE Linux denials. Based on these denials, 
permissions were added to allow the application to function properly. This allowed for 
the POLP to be followed when adding AVRs to the policy. The contents of the files for 
the policy changes and additions can be found in Appendix B. We describe some of the 
details below. 
1. App.te 
Some changes were made in the app.te file. In earlier versions of SE Android, 
there were two types of applications defined in this file: untrusted and trusted. When the 
trusted applications were split into platform, shared, media, and release applications, the 
AVRs regarding the use of binder were altered. In that alteration, it became possible for 
untrusted applications to perform binder IPC to other untrusted applications. In fact any 
application in the appdomain could now perform binder IPC to any other application in 
the appdomain. As noted earlier, every application on the device is a member of the 
appdomain, so every application could now perform binder IPC to every other 
application. 
We reverted this change in the app.te file. This involved adding rules allowing 
the following: 
• The appdomain can perform binder IPC with each of the trusted 
application domains. 
• Each trusted application domain can perform binder IPC with every other 
trusted application domain. 
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• Each trusted application domain can perform binder IPC with the 
appdomain 
Thus, the only thing now disallowed is for untrusted applications performing 
binder IPC with other untrusted applications. Without this change, it is impossible to 
place restrictions on what applications can use the binder channel. As shown in Figure 
26, if this change was not made, then communication between view0_app and 
view1_app would be allowed. 
 
Figure 26.   Apol analysis of information flow using the default app.te file 
2. Seapp_contexts 
The seapp_contexts file was updated to allow for the distinct labeling of the 
separate applications. Four statements were added; one for each of the applications.   
 
Figure 27.   Additions to seapp_contexts 
As Figure 27 shows, the name string in each statement refers to one of the 
application packages. Each application process will be labeled with its own distinct 
domain. The files are labeled with the same type, but will be separated by the category 
labeling done by levelFromUid. 
A quick check with adb shell ps –Z gives us the following security contexts for 
the processes: 
Information flows into view1_app from view1_app 
Objects classes for IN flows: 
 fd 
 allow appdomain appdomain : fd use ; 
 
user=app_* name=com.poc.displayapp domain=display_app  
type=app_data_file levelFromUid=true 
user=app_* name=com.poc.trustedcontroller  
domain=controller_app type=app_data_file  
levelFromUid=true 
user=app_* name=com.poc.view0 domain=view0_app  
type=app_data_file levelFromUid=true 
user=app_* name=com.poc.view1 domain=view1_app  




Figure 28.   Process security contexts 
And similarly, adb ls –Z /data/data, for the file contexts: 
 
Figure 29.   File security contexts 
3. Poc_app.te 
The poc_app.te file contains the AVRs for the proof-of-concept applications. 
There are only a handful of rules needed. Each new application domain must be 
associated with the base domain as well as the appdomain. This is accomplished with 
the following two statements: 
 
Figure 30.   poc_app.te domain associations 
Additionally, a number of binder permissions are used to allow the applications to 
communicate with the other applications they need to communicate with. The display 
application must be able to perform binder IPC with the trusted controller. The trusted 
controller must perform binder IPC with each of the calendar applications. These rules 
can be accomplished using three binder macros: binder_use(domain), 
binder_call(clientdomain, servicedomain), and 
binder_transfer(clientdomain, servicedomain). 
u:r:display_app:s0:c37  com.poc.displayapp 
u:r:controller_app:s0:c36 com.poc.trustedcontroller 
u:r:view0_app:s0:c34  com.poc.view0 
u:r:view1_app:s0:c35  com.poc.view1 
 
u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c37  com.poc.displayapp 
u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c36  com.poc.trustedcontroller 
u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c34  com.poc.view0 
u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c35  com.poc.view1 
 




Updating the mac_permissions.xml is entirely optional for developers. That 
being said, it is a good way to improve the security of applications. In our proof-of-
concept, the applications use custom permissions to restrict who can talk to whom. That 
doesn’t stop a potentially malicious application from simply reading the 
AndroidManifest.xml files and putting that permission in its own manifest. By 
updating the mac_permissions.xml file, those custom permissions can be further 
protected by only allowing certain applications to have those permissions. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the mac_permissions.xml file can 
allow for packages to specify their own allow or deny permission rules. The proof-of-
concept application packages were added and their corresponding permissions marked 
allowed. Additionally, under the default scheme, all permissions used by the new 
packages were denied. 
F. SE LINUX POLICY ANALYSIS 
It turns out that traditional tools like Apol are not all that useful when analyzing 
policies for SE Android. This is primarily because of the strong separation that SE 
Android aims for. There is very little domain transitioning done, and when it does occur, 
it is usually some system process like zygote or installd that is doing a single, one 
way, transition into an application domain. Further, third party applications do not 
typically communicate with other third party applications so the sharing of files does not 
occur often. Nevertheless, we can verify that there are no information flows that violate 
our security goals. We used Apol and Qisaq to evaluate the policy. 
1. Apol 
We can verify that there is no information flows between the view0_app and 
view1_app domains by doing a transitive information flow analysis in Apol. It yields 
four flows which, when scrutinized, are not of a concern. The first flow is as follows: 
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Figure 31.   Information flow from Apol for view1_app to view0_app 
All of those flows are disabled due to a SE Boolean. Unfortunately, Apol does not 
have the capability to show which Boolean it is without doing some digging. Looking 
through Apol’s policy rules and conditional expressions tab, it turns out that the Boolean 
governing these flows is the android_cts Boolean. This Boolean would only be 
enabled when the Android Compatibility Test Suite, which is used by developers to test 
their apps on various devices, is being used, so these AVRs should never be enabled in 
real-world use. The other three flows involve transitioning through the 
mlstrustedsubjects, debuggerd and zygote. Being 
mlstrustedsubjects, these are assumed to be trusted so those flows should not be 
allowed by these subjects. 
We can further verify that communication is allowed from the display_app 
domain to the controller_app domain, and similarly for the controller_app 
domain to the view0_app and view1_app domains: 
 
Figure 32.   AVRs allowing flow from display_app to controller_app and 
controller_app to view0_app and view1_app 
These allow for the corresponding applications to use file descriptors that are 
passed via the binder connections. This allows for the passing of data between the 
applications. 
Flow 1 requires 1 step(s). 
view1_app -> view0_app 
allow appdomain domain:file {ioctl read getattr lock  
open}; [Disabled] 
allow appdomain domain:dir {ioctl read getattr search  
open}; [Disabled] 
allow appdomain domain:lnk_file {ioctl read getattr  
lock open}; [Disabled] 
 
allow display_app controller_app : fd use; 
allow controller_app view0_app : fd use; 
allow controller_app view1_app : fd use; 
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2. Qisaq 
Qisaq, as mentioned earlier, is a Python interface to SETools. Qisaq works by 
importing SE Linux policies and constructing directed graphs with the types being the 
nodes and the AVRs and domain transitions representing edges. For large policies, like 
the SE Linux reference policy, the conversion to graphs uses a large amount of both 
memory and time. Fortunately, the SE Android policy is small enough to be analyzed in a 
reasonable amount of time. 
Qisaq, like Apol, can detect direct information flows. Additionally, it will provide 
the constraints that restrict flow between two domains. The SE Android policy only 
contains MLS constraints, and as none of the proof-of-concept applications are 
mlstrustedsubjects nor do any dominate the others, these constraints do not apply. Direct 
information flow from view0_app to view1_app is as follows: 
 
Figure 33.   Qisaq information flow between view0_app and view1_app 
All of these flows are denied by a Boolean as mentioned earlier, but Qisaq does 
not yet account for them when doing the graph analysis. 
Qisaq can also look for indirect influences between two domains. It does so by 
looking for paths going through types that are not considered trusted mediators. To do 
this analysis, all mlstrustedsubjects were added to the set of trusted mediators. 
Then, Qisaq does a ‘breakout’ analysis looking for paths between two domains going 
through types not included in the set. Doing this analysis for view0_app and 
view1_app yields no paths outside the mediators. As noted in the Apol section, there 
Information can flow directly from view0_app to view1_app: 
view0_app can invoke class lnk_file read operations  
{getattr, read} on view1_app 
view0_app can invoke class dir read operations  
{getattr, read, search} on view1_app 
view0_app can invoke class file read operations  
{getattr, read} on view1_app 
view0_app can invoke class lnk_file unmapped  
operations {open} on view1_app 
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were information flows from view0_app to view1_app through debuggerd and 
zygote. Both of these are mlstrustedsubjects and are included in the set of 
trusted mediators. 
G. DISCUSSION 
As mentioned earlier, using the current architecture it is possible for data to pass 
from view0_app to the view1_app through the allowed communication channels. 
We propose an alternate architecture to eliminate this.   
The proposal is to add a new application to work alongside each of the calendar 
applications. This new application will access the content provider implemented by the 
original calendar applications with only read permissions. We now have two applications 
interacting with the content provider: application A, the original calendar application, and 
application B, the new application. Application B would now be the one that the trusted 
controller interacts with when interacting in a restricted mode. In other words, if the 
mode selected was view0, then the trusted controller would interact with application B of 
view1. With application B only having read permission to the content provider, it would 
not be able to update tables with information obtained from view0. This new architecture 
is represented in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34.   New architecture. Only the two flows of the same mode occur at the same time. 
We can ensure that the trusted controller only connects to application A or B 
appropriately by using a new SE Boolean. By having the main application set the 
Boolean upon choosing a mode, we can ensure that the trusted controller can never write 
data to the data stores of view0 and view1 at the same time. The policy for the trusted 

















Figure 35.   Proposed policy change for new architecture 
  
bool view0 false; 
bool view1 false; 
type controller_app, domain; 
app_domain(controller_app) 
binder_use(controller_app) 


















VII.  CONCLUSION 
A. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis contributes to the currently limited literature on SE Android. With SE 
Android still being in its infancy, there is much more work that can and should be done. 
This section mentions some possible future work to be done on SE Android that is not 
necessarily an extension of this thesis. 
The architecture proposed at the end of Chapter VI should be explored further. 
The reason this architecture was not implemented was due to some challenges in 
implementing the setting of the SE Boolean. Access to the Java library for 
android.os.SELinux is not readily available for importing into an IDE (Integrated 
Development Environment). We attempted to include the package needing access to it in 
the build path and rebuilding the image. However, we were unable to get the Boolean to 
properly set as needed by the architecture. Further exploration of the SE Manager 
application source code may reveal why we failed. 
The continued development of our proof-of-concept into a full-fledged calendar 
manager raises many questions. We must consider how the calendars will be updated and 
ensure that the data remains isolated between the calendars. The architecture proposed 
above helps to facilitate this. Additionally, one may want to consider how to secure the 
data in the calendars. Some form of authentication should be used to control access to 
each of the calendars. One way of doing this is to use  a login and password to protect the 
calendars from unauthorized access. Separate passwords could be used for each of the 
calendars. In adding this authentication, a display mode could be made available for 
unauthorized users having limited access to both calendars. Our initial thought is to not 
allow even this limited access as it provides potential adversaries with some information. 
However, in discussing some potential features below, that mode may be useful. One 
may also wish to consider encrypting the calendars’ data stored on the phone. This will 
help protect the data in the event of an adversary having physical access to the phone. 
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Other calendar features also raise some questions on how to maintain the security 
goals. For instance, many calendars have an alarm feature. One should consider how this 
would work in our implementation. The alarm needs to have some access to the data to 
be able to notify the user. Is it sufficient to have only the limited access mode?  In this 
case it would allow the alarm to function without having the need for the user to be 
authenticated with one of the calendars. This is an interesting issue that should be 
explored further. 
As mentioned in Chapter VI, our proof-of-concept stores its data locally. In the 
real world, it is more likely for this data to be stored remotely (in the cloud) so that it can 
be accessed from multiple devices. Instead of the data coming from content providers 
managed by the application, the data now comes over a network connection from a 
storage location not directly managed. This may have an impact on the architecture and 
whether the security goals can still be reached. How can the proof of concept be changed 
to maintain its security goals?  Is it as simple as replacing the functions in the separate 
calendar applications that access the content providers with functions that access the 
cloud storage?  That would allow for the general architecture to remain intact, but maybe 
not the proposed modified architecture. Does the way the calendar is stored in the cloud 
allow for a read only mode?  Should this data be stored locally in the calendars or can it 
simply be sent to the display and discarded?  Many questions arise when considering the 
use of the cloud. 
We mentioned in Chapter VI that we are assuming that the trusted controller 
behaves properly. This particular element of the proof-of-concept will need to be 
formally verified and analyzed if it were to be used in the full implementation. Requests 
to the trusted controller must be handled properly so as to not allow data to flow between 
the separate calendars applications.   
Apart from questions regarding the calendar application, there are questions 
related to the use of SE Android. As Smalley mentions in [10], SE Android has not been 
specifically evaluated or approved for use. A considerable amount of work needs to be 
done on SE Android before this can happen. One example is that an in depth analysis of 
altered Android code that facilitates SE Android should be performed; particularly for 
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processes such as zygote to verify that the labeling of forked processes is done 
correctly.   
A more formal analysis of the finalized SE Android policy would also need to be 
done. As of the writing of this thesis the policy is still a work in progress. It may be some 
time before a finalized version of the policy is available for complete analysis. 
B. SUMMARY 
Chapter V described the mechanisms that SE Android implements to improve 
Android security. The features mentioned were the traditional SE Linux MAC, install-
time MAC, tag propagation, and permission revocation. It went into further detail on the 
organization of the SE Android policy and the unique additions that differentiate it from 
traditional SE Linux.   
The proof-of-concept application in Chapter VI demonstrates how to edit the SE 
Android policy files to enforce security goals for custom applications. Creating policies 
for new applications is fairly straightforward. Labeling of new application packages can 
be done in the seapp_contexts file. SE Android provides domains and macros to 
make it easy to obtain the base set of permissions required for applications to operate. 
MAC can also be applied to the Android permissions; allowing or denying only specified 
application packages access to certain permissions. 
In Chapter VI, we also identify a potential weakness in the default SE Android 
policy. The default policy allows for any third party application to perform binder calls to 
any other third party application. We modify the app.te file to enable restrictions to be 
placed on the use of binder channels. 
While SE Android is meant to be a security extension transparent to application 
developers and users, this thesis demonstrates how it can be customized for use on a 
specific set of applications to improve security.  
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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF CONCEPT CODE 
The Java classes and Android manifests for the applications developed for the 
proof-of-concept application. 













public class MainActivity extends Activity { 
 private static String TAG = “main.activity”; 
 private RadioGroup viewGroup; 
 private Button button1; 
 private int view = -1; 
 
    @Override 
    public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
        setContentView(R.layout.activity_main); 
     viewGroup = (RadioGroup) findViewById(R.id.radioGroup1); 
     button1 = (Button) findViewById(R.id.button1); 
        requestView(); 
    } 
         
    public void requestView() { 
   button1.setOnClickListener(new OnClickListener() { 
      @Override 
      public void onClick(View v) { 
       switch (viewGroup.getCheckedRadioButtonId()) { 
        case R.id.radio0: 
         view = 0; 
         break; 
        case R.id.radio1: 
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         view = 1; 
         break; 
       } 
       Intent i = new Intent(getApplicationContext(), 
DisplayActivity.class); 
       i.putExtra(“view,” view); 
       System.out.println(“mview: “ + view); 
       Log.d(TAG, “Starting display”); 
       startActivity(i); 
      } 
     }); 



























public class DisplayActivity extends Activity { 
 private Button b; 
 private BroadcastReceiver receiver; 
 private IntentFilter intentFilter; 
 ItcService mService; 
 boolean mBounded; 
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 private int vmode = -1; 
  
 private ServiceConnection mConnection = new ServiceConnection() { 
         
  @Override 
     public void onServiceDisconnected(ComponentName name) { 
      mBounded = false; 
      mService = null; 
     } 
     @Override 
     public void onServiceConnected(ComponentName name, IBinder service) { 
      mService = ItcService.Stub.asInterface(service); 
      mBounded = true; 
     } 
    }; 
      
 @Override 
    public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
        setContentView(R.layout.activity_display); 
        b = (Button)findViewById(R.id.button1); 
         
        b.setOnClickListener(new View.OnClickListener() { 
         public void onClick(View v) { 
          sendRequest(vmode); 
         } 
        }); 
         
        receiver = new BroadcastReceiver() { 
         @Override 
         public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) { 
          updateTable(intent); 
         } 




 public void onStart() { 
  super.onStart(); 
 
        intentFilter = new IntentFilter(“com.poc.displayapp.vDisplay”); 
        this.registerReceiver(this.receiver, intentFilter); 
         
        Intent sIntent = getIntent(); 
 74 
        vmode = sIntent.getIntExtra(“view,” -1); 
         
        Intent serviceIntent = new Intent(); 
        serviceIntent.setClassName(“com.poc.trustedcontroller,” 
“com.poc.trustedcontroller.MainService”); 
        boolean ok = bindService(serviceIntent, mConnection, 
Context.BIND_AUTO_CREATE); 
        Log.v(“bound ok? ,” String.valueOf(ok));  
         
    }  
     
    @Override 
    protected void onResume() { 
     super.onResume(); 
     this.registerReceiver(this.receiver, intentFilter); 
    } 
     
    @Override 
    public void onStop() { 
     super.onStop(); 
     if (mBounded) { 
      unbindService(mConnection); 
      mBounded = false; 
     } 
    } 
     
    @Override 
    protected void onPause() { 
     this.unregisterReceiver(receiver); 
     if (mBounded) { 
      unbindService(mConnection); 
      mBounded = false; 
     } 
     super.onPause(); 
    } 
         
 private void sendRequest(int view) { 
  Intent request = new Intent(“com.poc.trustedcontroller.MainService”); 
  request.putExtra(“view,” view); 
  try { 
   mService.readTables(request); 
  } catch (RemoteException e) { 
   Log.e(“RemoteException,” e.toString()); 




    public void updateTable(Intent i) { 
      
     int origin = i.getIntExtra(“source,” -1); 
        ArrayList<String> dates = i.getStringArrayListExtra(“dates”); 
        ArrayList<String> appointments = i.getStringArrayListExtra(“appointments”); 
        TableLayout tl = new TableLayout(this); 
 
        if (origin == 0) { 
         tl = (TableLayout)findViewById(R.id.tableLayout1); 
        } 
        else if (origin == 1) { 
         tl = (TableLayout)findViewById(R.id.tableLayout2); 
        } 
        updateRows(tl, dates, appointments); 
    } 
     
    @SuppressWarnings(“deprecation”) 
 public void updateRows(TableLayout tlayout, ArrayList<String> dates,  
      ArrayList<String> appointments) { 
     System.out.println(“size “ + dates.size()); 
     for (int j=0; j < dates.size(); j++) { 
         TableRow tr = new TableRow(this); 
      TextView date = new TextView(this); 
      TextView data = new TextView(this); 
         tr.setLayoutParams(new LayoutParams( 
           LayoutParams.FILL_PARENT, 
            LayoutParams.WRAP_CONTENT)); 
         tr.setBackgroundColor(Color.GRAY); 
         tr.setId(100+j); 
         date.setId(200+j); 
         data.setId(300+j); 
         date.setText(dates.get(j)); 
       data.setText(appointments.get(j)); 
         tr.addView(date); 
         tr.addView(data); 
         tlayout.addView(tr, new TableLayout.LayoutParams( 
           LayoutParams.FILL_PARENT, 
           LayoutParams.WRAP_CONTENT)); 
     } 






    package=“com.poc.displayapp” 
    android:versionCode=“1” 
    android:versionName=“1.0” > 
 
    <uses-sdk 
        android:minSdkVersion=“8” 
        android:targetSdkVersion=“15” /> 
     
 <uses-permission android:name=“com.poc.trustedcontroller.tcpermission” /> 
 <uses-permission android:name=“com.poc.view0.v0receive” /> 
 <uses-permission android:name=“com.poc.view1.v1receive” /> 
  
    <application 
        android:icon=“@drawable/ic_launcher” 
        android:label=“@string/app_name” 
        android:theme=“@style/AppTheme” > 
        <activity 
            android:name=.”MainActivity” 
            android:label=“@string/title_activity_main” > 
            <intent-filter> 
                <action android:name=“android.intent.action.MAIN” /> 
                <category android:name=“android.intent.category.LAUNCHER” /> 
            </intent-filter> 
        </activity> 
         
        <activity 
            android:name=.”DisplayActivity” 
            android:label=“@string/title_activity_display” > 
            <intent-filter> 
                <action android:name=“com.poc.displayapp.vDisplay” /> 
            </intent-filter> 
        </activity> 






















public class MainService extends Service { 
 private static String TAG = “tc.service”; 
 static final int VIEW0 = 0; 
 static final int VIEW1 = 1; 
 private static final String action0 = “com.poc.view0.View0Service”; 
 private static final String action1 = “com.poc.view1.View1Service”; 
 Iv0Service v0Service; 
 Iv1Service v1Service; 
 boolean mBounded0; 
 boolean mBounded1; 
  
 private ServiceConnection mConnection0 = new ServiceConnection() { 
   
  @Override 
  public void onServiceDisconnected(ComponentName name) { 
   mBounded0 = false; 
   v0Service = null; 
  } 
   
  @Override 
  public void onServiceConnected(ComponentName name, IBinder service)  
{ 
   v0Service = Iv0Service.Stub.asInterface(service); 
   mBounded0 = true; 




 private ServiceConnection mConnection1 = new ServiceConnection() { 
   
  @Override 
  public void onServiceDisconnected(ComponentName name) { 
   mBounded1 = false; 
   v1Service = null; 
  } 
   
  @Override 
  public void onServiceConnected(ComponentName name, IBinder service)  
{ 
   v1Service = Iv1Service.Stub.asInterface(service); 
   mBounded1 = true; 
  } 
 }; 
   
 @SuppressWarnings(“deprecation”) 
 @Override 
 public void onStart(Intent intent, int startId) { 




 public void onCreate() { 
  super.onCreate(); 
  Log.d(TAG, “TCService created”); 
 
  Intent serviceIntent1 = new Intent(); 
  serviceIntent1.setClassName(“com.poc.view0,” 
“com.poc.view0.View0Service”); 
  boolean ok1 = bindService(serviceIntent1, mConnection0, 
Context.BIND_AUTO_CREATE); 
  Log.v(“bound ok1? ,” String.valueOf(ok1)); 
  Intent serviceIntent2 = new Intent(); 
   
  serviceIntent2.setClassName(“com.poc.view1,” 
“com.poc.view1.View1Service”); 
  boolean ok2 = bindService(serviceIntent2, mConnection1, 
Context.BIND_AUTO_CREATE); 
  Log.v(“bound ok2? ,” String.valueOf(ok2)); 





 public IBinder onBind(Intent intent) { 
  return mBinder; 
 }  
  
 private final ItcService.Stub mBinder = new Stub() { 
   
 public void insertTable(Intent intent) { 
  int view = intent.getIntExtra(“view,” -1); 
  ArrayList<String> columns = intent.getStringArrayListExtra(“columns”); 
  ArrayList<String> data = intent.getStringArrayListExtra(“data”); 
  Intent i = new Intent(); 
  if (view == 0) { 
   i.setAction(action0); 
   i.putExtra(“view,” view); 
  } else if (view == 1) { 
   i.setAction(action1); 
   i.putExtra(“view,” view); 
  } 
  startService(i); 
  } 
    
 public void readTables(Intent intent) { 
  int view = intent.getIntExtra(“view,” -1); 
  Intent i = new Intent(action0); 
  i.putExtra(“view,” view); 
  Intent j = new Intent(action1); 
  j.putExtra(“view,” view); 
  try { 
   v0Service.queryTables(i); 
   v1Service.queryTables(j); 
  } catch (RemoteException e) { 
   Log.e(“RemoteException,” e.toString()); 





 public void onDestroy() { 
  if (mBounded0) { 
   unbindService(mConnection0); 
   mBounded0 = false; 
  } 
  if (mBounded1) { 
   unbindService(mConnection1); 
   mBounded1 = false; 
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  } 
  stopService(new Intent(action0)); 
  stopService(new Intent(action1)); 
  super.onDestroy(); 








public interface TcService { 
 void readTables(Intent intent); 




    package=“com.poc.trustedcontroller” 
    android:versionCode=“1” 
    android:versionName=“1.0” > 
    <uses-sdk 
        android:minSdkVersion=“8” 
        android:targetSdkVersion=“15” /> 
   <permission  
       android:name=“com.poc.trustedcontroller.tcpermission” 
       android:label=“tcpermission” 
       android:protectionLevel=“dangerous” /> 
 
   <uses-permission android:name=“com.poc.view0.v0permission” /> 
   <uses-permission android:name=“com.poc.view1.v1permission” /> 
  
    <application 
        android:icon=“@drawable/ic_launcher” 
        android:label=“@string/app_name” 
        android:theme=“@style/AppTheme” > 
        <service 
            android:permission=“com.poc.trustedcontroller.tcpermission” 
 android:enabled=“true” 
            android:name=“MainService” > 
            <intent-filter> 
                <action android:name=“com.poc.trustedcontroller.MainService” /> 
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            </intent-filter> 
        </service> 
    </application> 
</manifest> 
C. PACKAGE COM.POC.VIEW0 
The files for com.poc.view1 are identical to com.poc.view0 sans the name 


















 public void onStart(Intent intent, int startId) { 




 public void onCreate() { 




 public IBinder onBind(Intent intent) { 
  return mBinder; 
 } 
  
 private final Iv0Service.Stub mBinder = new Stub() { 
 
  public void queryTables(Intent intent) { 
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   int view = intent.getIntExtra(“view,” -1); 
   Uri curi = view0provider.CONTENT_URI; 
   ArrayList<String> dates = new ArrayList<String>(); 
   ArrayList<String> appointments = new ArrayList<String>(); 
    
   if (view == 0) { 
    String[] columns = { 
      DatesTable.COLUMN_DATE, 
      DatesTable.COLUMN_COMMENT 
    }; 
    Cursor c = getContentResolver().query(curi, columns, null, 
null, null); 
  
    if (c.moveToFirst()) { 
     do { 
      String d = 
c.getString(c.getColumnIndex(DatesTable.COLUMN_DATE)); 
      String a = 
c.getString(c.getColumnIndex(DatesTable.COLUMN_COMMENT)); 
      dates.add(d); 
      appointments.add(a); 
     } while (c.moveToNext()); 
    } 
    c.close(); 
   } else { 
    String[] columns = { 
      DatesTable.COLUMN_DATE 
    }; 
    Cursor c = getContentResolver().query(curi, columns, null, 
null, null); 
    if (c.moveToFirst()) { 
     do { 
      String d = 
c.getString(c.getColumnIndex(DatesTable.COLUMN_DATE)); 
      String a = “redacted”; 
      dates.add(d); 
      appointments.add(a); 
     } while (c.moveToNext()); 
    } 
    c.close(); 
   } 
   String action = “com.poc.displayapp.vDisplay”; 
   String permission = “com.poc.view0.v0receive”; 
   Intent i = new Intent(action); 
   i.putExtra(“dates,” dates); 
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   i.putExtra(“appointments,” appointments); 
   i.putExtra(“source,” 0); 
   sendBroadcast(i, permission); 



















public class view0provider extends ContentProvider { 
 
 private DBHelper database; 
 private static final int DATES = 1; 
 private static final int DATES_ID = 2; 
 private static final String AUTHORITY = “com.poc.view0”; 
 private static final String BASE_PATH = “dates”; 
 public static final Uri CONTENT_URI = Uri.parse(“content://” + AUTHORITY 
+ “/” + BASE_PATH); 
 public static final String CONTENT_TYPE = 
ContentResolver.CURSOR_DIR_BASE_TYPE + “/dates”; 
 public static final String CONTENT_ITEM_TYPE = 
ContentResolver.CURSOR_ITEM_BASE_TYPE + “/date”; 
  
 private static final UriMatcher sURIMatcher = new 
UriMatcher(UriMatcher.NO_MATCH); 
 static { 
  sURIMatcher.addURI(AUTHORITY, BASE_PATH, DATES); 





 public boolean onCreate() { 
  database = new DBHelper(getContext()); 




 public Cursor query(Uri uri, String[] projection, String selection, 
   String[] selectionArgs, String sortOrder) { 
  SQLiteQueryBuilder qb = new SQLiteQueryBuilder(); 
  checkColumns(projection); 
  qb.setTables(DatesTable.TABLE_DATES); 
  int uriType = sURIMatcher.match(uri); 
  switch (uriType) { 
  case DATES: 
   break; 
  case DATES_ID: 
   qb.appendWhere(DatesTable.COLUMN_ID + “=“ + 
uri.getLastPathSegment()); 
   break; 
  default: 
   throw new IllegalArgumentException(“Unknown URI: “ + uri); 
  } 
  SQLiteDatabase db = database.getWritableDatabase(); 
  Cursor c = qb.query(db, projection, selection, selectionArgs, null, null, 
sortOrder); 
  c.setNotificationUri(getContext().getContentResolver(), uri); 




 public int delete(Uri uri, String arg1, String[] arg2) { 
  int uriType = sURIMatcher.match(uri); 
  SQLiteDatabase db = database.getWritableDatabase(); 
  int rowsDeleted = 0; 
  switch (uriType) { 
  case DATES: 
   rowsDeleted = db.delete(DatesTable.TABLE_DATES, arg1, arg2); 
   break; 
  case DATES_ID: 
   String id = uri.getLastPathSegment(); 
   if (TextUtils.isEmpty(arg1)) { 
    rowsDeleted = db.delete(DatesTable.TABLE_DATES, 
DatesTable.COLUMN_ID + “=“ + id, null); 
   } else { 
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    rowsDeleted = db.delete(DatesTable.TABLE_DATES, 
DatesTable.COLUMN_ID + “=“ + id + “ and “ + arg1, arg2); 
   } 
   break; 
  default: 
   throw new IllegalArgumentException(“Unkown URI: “ + uri); 
  } 
  getContext().getContentResolver().notifyChange(uri, null); 




 public String getType(Uri uri) { 




 public Uri insert(Uri uri, ContentValues values) { 
  int uriType = sURIMatcher.match(uri); 
  SQLiteDatabase db = database.getWritableDatabase(); 
  long id = 0; 
  switch (uriType) { 
  case DATES: 
   id = db.insert(DatesTable.TABLE_DATES, null, values); 
   break; 
  default: 
   throw new IllegalArgumentException(“Unkown URI: “ + uri); 
  } 
  getContext().getContentResolver().notifyChange(uri, null); 




 public int update(Uri uri, ContentValues values, String selection, 
   String[] selectionArgs) { 
  int uriType = sURIMatcher.match(uri); 
  SQLiteDatabase db = database.getWritableDatabase(); 
  int rowsUpdated = 0; 
  switch (uriType) { 
  case DATES: 
   rowsUpdated = db.update(DatesTable.TABLE_DATES, values, 
selection, selectionArgs); 
   break; 
  case DATES_ID: 
   String id = uri.getLastPathSegment(); 
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   if (TextUtils.isEmpty(selection)) { 
    rowsUpdated = db.update(DatesTable.TABLE_DATES, 
values, DatesTable.COLUMN_ID + “=“ + id, null); 
   } else { 
    rowsUpdated = db.update(DatesTable.TABLE_DATES, 
values, DatesTable.COLUMN_ID + “=“ + id + “ and “ + selection, selectionArgs); 
   } 
   break; 
  default: 
   throw new IllegalArgumentException(“Unknown URI: “ + uri); 
  } 
  getContext().getContentResolver().notifyChange(uri, null); 
  return rowsUpdated; 
 } 
  
 private void checkColumns(String[] projection) { 
  String[] available = { DatesTable.COLUMN_ID, 
DatesTable.COLUMN_DATE, DatesTable.COLUMN_COMMENT }; 
  if (projection != null) { 
   HashSet<String> requestedColumns = new 
HashSet<String>(Arrays.asList(projection)); 
   HashSet<String> availableColumns = new 
HashSet<String>(Arrays.asList(available)); 
   if (!availableColumns.containsAll(requestedColumns)) { 
    throw new IllegalArgumentException(“Unknown columns 
in projection”); 
   } 










public class DBHelper extends SQLiteOpenHelper { 
 
 private static final String DATABASE_NAME = “dates.db”; 
 private static final int DATABASE_VERSION = 1; 
  
  
 public DBHelper(Context context) { 
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 public void onCreate(SQLiteDatabase database) { 




 public void onUpgrade(SQLiteDatabase database, int oldVersion, int 
newVersion) { 










public class DatesTable { 
 
 public static final String TABLE_DATES = “dates”; 
 public static final String COLUMN_ID = “_id”; 
 public static final String COLUMN_DATE = “date”; 
 public static final String COLUMN_COMMENT = “comment”; 
 private static final String DATABASE_CREATE = “create table “ + 
TABLE_DATES + “(“ +  
   COLUMN_ID + “ integer primary key autoincrement, “ +  
   COLUMN_DATE + “ text not null, “ +  
   COLUMN_COMMENT + “ text);”; 
  
 private static final String INSERT1 = “insert into “ + TABLE_DATES + 
   “ (“ + COLUMN_DATE + ,” “ + COLUMN_COMMENT + “)” + 
   “ values (‘Sept1’, ‘Blah’);”; 
 private static final String INSERT2 = “insert into “ + TABLE_DATES + 
   “ (“ + COLUMN_DATE + ,” “ + COLUMN_COMMENT + “)” + 
   “ values (‘Sept2’, ‘Bleh’);”; 
 private static final String INSERT3 = “insert into “ + TABLE_DATES + 
   “ (“ + COLUMN_DATE + ,” “ + COLUMN_COMMENT + “)” + 
   “ values (‘Sept3’, ‘Bluh’);”; 
  
 public static void onCreate(SQLiteDatabase db) { 
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  db.execSQL(DATABASE_CREATE); 
  db.execSQL(INSERT1); 
  db.execSQL(INSERT2); 
  db.execSQL(INSERT3); 
 } 
  
 public static void onUpgrade(SQLiteDatabase db, int oldVersion, int newVersion) 
{ 
  Log.w(DBHelper.class.getName(), “Upgrading database from version “ + 
oldVersion + “ to “ + 
    newVersion + ,” which will destroy all old data”); 
  db.execSQL(“drop table if exists “ + TABLE_DATES); 






    package=“com.poc.view0” 
    android:versionCode=“1” 
    android:versionName=“1.0” > 
 
    <uses-sdk 
        android:minSdkVersion=“8” 
        android:targetSdkVersion=“15” /> 
 <permission 
     android:name=“com.poc.view0.v0permission” 
     android:label=“v0permission” 
     android:protectionLevel=“normal” /> 
 <permission 
     android:name=“com.poc.view0.v0receive” 
     android:label=“v0receive” 
     android:protectionLevel=“normal” /> 
  
    <application 
        android:icon=“@drawable/ic_launcher” 
        android:label=“@string/app_name” 
        android:theme=“@style/AppTheme” > 
        <service 
            android:permission=“com.poc.view0.v0permission” 
            android:enabled=“true” 
            android:name=.”View0Service” > 
            <intent-filter> 
                <action android:name=“com.poc.view0.View0Service” /> 
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            </intent-filter> 
        </service> 
        <provider  
            android:name=.”view0provider”  
            android:authorities=“com.poc.view0” > 
        </provider>  
    </application> 
</manifest>  
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APPENDIX B. SE POLICY 




user=system domain=system_app type=system_data_file 
user=nfc domain=nfc type=nfc_data_file 
user=radio domain=radio type=radio_data_file 
user=app_* domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFromUid=true 
user=app_* seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=platform_app_data_file 
user=app_* seinfo=shared domain=shared_app type=platform_app_data_file 
user=app_* seinfo=media domain=media_app type=platform_app_data_file 
user=app_* seinfo=release domain=release_app type=platform_app_data_file 
user=app_* seinfo=release name=com.android.browser domain=browser_app  
type=platform_app_data_file 
user=app_* name=com.poc.displayapp domain=display_app type=app_data_file 
 levelFromUid=true 
user=app_* name=com.poc.trustedcontroller domain=controller_app type=app_data_file 
 levelFromUid=true 


































type view1_app, domain; 
app_domain(view1_app) 
 




























E. MODIFICATIONS TO MAC_PERMISSIONS.XML 
+<package name=“com.poc.displayapp” > 
+ <allow-permission name=“com.poc.trustedcontroller.tcpermission” /> 
+ <allow-permission name=“com.poc.view0.v0receive” /> 
+ <allow-permission name=“com.poc.view1.v1receive” /> 
+</package> 
 
+<package name=“com.poc.trustedcontroller” > 
+ <allow-permission name=“com.poc.view0.v0permission” /> 
+ <allow-permission name=“com.poc.view1.v1permission” /> 
+</package> 
 
Under the <default> tag: 
+ <deny-permission name=“com.poc.trustedcontroller.tcpermission” /> 
+ <deny-permission name=“com.poc.view0.v0permission” /> 
+ <deny-permission name=“com.poc.view1.v1permission” /> 
+ <deny-permission name=“com.poc.view0.v0receive” /> 
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